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"MIND CONTROL," "SYNTHETIC SANITY,"
"ARTIFICIAL COMPETENCE," AND
GENUINE CONFUSION: LEGALLY
RELEVANT EFFECTS OF ANTIPSYCHOTIC
MEDICATION
Thomas G. Gutheil, M.D.* & Paul S. Appelbaum, M.D.**

Several recent court decisions have granted committed mental
patients statutory or constitutional rights to refuse unwanted treatment provided that the patient did not present dangers to himself or
others.1 Typically, the treatment in question has involved a class of
drugs referred to as "antipsychotic medication." Although these
cases have created a storm of controversy in both the medical and
legal professions, 2 the debate has largely ignored an issue that plays
*Associate Professor of Psychiatry & Director, Program in Psychiatry and Law, Massachusetts Mental Health Center, Harvard Medical School; A.B., Harvard College, 1963; M.D.,
Harvard Medical School, 1967.
**Assistant Professor of Psychiatry, University of Pittsburgh School of Medicine; Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law; Co-Director, Law and Psychiatry Program, Western Psychiatric Institute and Clinic; A.B., Columbia College, 1972; M.D.,
Harvard Medical School, 1976.
1. Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1980); Rogers v. Okn,478 F. Supp.
1342 (D. Mass. 1979), affd in part, rev'd in part, vacated and remanded, 634 F.2d 650 (1st
Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982); Rennie v.
Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979), affd in part, modified and remanded on other
grounds, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 102 S.Ct. 3506 (1982); Rennie
v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978); Goedecke v. State, 198 Colo. 407, 603 P.2d 123
(1979); Gundy v. Pauley, 619 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) (electroshock therapy); In re
Roe, III, 383 Mass. 415, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1981); In re K.K.B. 609 P.2d 747 (Okla. Sup. Ct.
1980).

2.

For comments from the psychiatric community, see, Appelbaum & Gutheil, The

Right to Refuse Treatment: The Real Issue is Quality of Care, 9 BULL. Am.ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L., 199 (1981); Appelbaum & Gutheil, Drug Refusal. A Study of Psychiatric Inpatients, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 340 (1980); Appelbaum & Gutheil, The Boston State Hospital
Case: "Involuntary Mind Control," the Constitution, and the "Right to Rot," 137 Amt. J.
PSYCHIATRY 720 (1980); Appelbaum & Gutheil, "Rotting With Their Rights On": Constitutional Theory and Clinical Reality in Drug Refusal by Psychiatric Patients, 7 BULL. Am.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 306 (1979); Gutheil, Restraint vs. Treatment: Seclusion as Discussed in the Boston State Hospital Case, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 718 (1980); Gutheil, Shapiro & St. Clair, Legal Guardianship in Drug Refusal: An Illusory Solution, 137 AM. J.
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a major role in the decisions themselves: the effect of antipsychotic
drugs on the human mind.
As this article illustrates, many of the courts that have been
confronted with the issue of a right to refuse treatment have constructed a profile of antipsychotic medications as "mind-altering" or
"thought-controlling." In particular, they have viewed these medications as capable of inhibiting thought processes or changing the content of thought. Given the constitutional underpinnings of many of
these decisions-the right to privacy or the right to freedom of
speech-such conceptualizations may have materially affected the
outcome of the courts' deliberations. One would assume, therefore,
that the courts had substantial evidence on which to base their conclusions that the drugs were mind-altering or thought-controlling. As
subsequently demonstrated, however, this assumption is fallacious.
This article examines various courts' conclusions concerning the
effects of antipsychotic medications. After reviewing judicial approaches to these medications in several of the most significant rightto-refuse-treatment cases, the article analyzes a related line of decisions generally overlooked: namely, criminal cases concerning the effects of antipsychotic medications on both defendants' competency to
stand trial and their proof of an insanity defense. Since the civil and
criminal cases take rather different approaches to the presumably
fact sensitive issue of the effects of antipsychotic drugs, the article
undertakes a review of the psychiatric and psychological literature
on the relevant effects of these medications on mentation (mental
activity). Finally, the authors propose an empirically based model of
the effects of antipsychotic medication that can be utilized as a foundation for resolving disputes about the use of antipsychotics in the
PSYCHIATRY 347 (1980); Malmquist, Can the Committed Patient Refuse Chemotherapy?, 36
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 351 (1979); Michels, The Right to Refuse Treatment: Ethical
Issues, 32 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 251 (1981); Stone, The Right to Refuse Treatment: Why PsychiatristsShould and Can Make It Work, 38 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 358
(1981).
For a sampling of the vast legal literature on the issue, see Brooks, The Constitutional
Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Medications, 8 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 179 (1980);
Ford, The Psychiatrist'sDouble Bind: The Right to Refuse Medication, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 332 (1980); Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental Patients' Right to Refuse
Treatment, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 461 (1977); Rhoden, The Right to Refuse Psychotropic Drugs,
15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 363 (1980); Shavill, Patients' Rights Vs. Patients' Needs: The
Right of the Mentally Ill to Refuse Treatment in Colorado, 58 DEN. L.J. 567 (1981); Symonds, Mental Patients' Rights to Refuse Drugs: Involuntary Medication as Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 701 (1980); Comment, Madness and Medicine:
The Forcible Administration of Psychotropic Drugs, 1980 WIs. L. REV. 497.
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variety of legal contexts where these problems abound. It is the authors' hope, therefore, to expose and clarify the factual inconsistencies in the courts' analysis of antipsychotic drugs and, thereby, to
foster the knowledgeable consideration of the delicate constitutional
questions addressed in these opinions.
To clarify subsequent discussion, some brief definitions are in
order. Psychotropic drugs include any medications that affect mentation.3 Sedatives, tranquilizers, hypnotics, and antipsychotics are all
subclasses of the psychotropes. Sedatives are medications that quiet,
calm, or allay excitement without primarily reducing anxiety or inducing sleep." Tranquilizers decrease anxiety and agitation; if sedation results it is merely an unwanted side effect of their use.
Hypnotics are medications administered to induce sleep.' Antipsychotics (also called neuroleptics) reverse the symptoms of major
mental illnesses (i.e., psychoses); their aim is the eventual restoration
of normal mentation. Antipsychotics are often inaccurately referred
to as "major tranquilizers." While they may secondarily calm anxiety, that is not their primary influence on the mind. Used to an excess, however, they may act like simple sedatives. Since antipsychotic medications have been the nearly exclusive focus of litigation
on the right to refuse treatment, this article extensively examines
the conflicting judicial views of this subclass of psychotropic
medications.
I.

PERCEPTIONS OF ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS IN COURT DECISIONS
CONCERNING THE RIGHT OF PSYCHIATRIC PATIENTS TO REFUSE
TREATMENT

Courts, in a variety of jurisdictions in the late 1970's and the
early 1980's, have grappled with the controversial question of
whether inpatients in psychiatric hospitals have a constitutional right
to refuse medical treatment. 8 The cases encompass a wide variety
and detail of complex clinical and legal situations and issues. While
an extensive analysis of the delicate constitutional issues involved in
these cases is beyond the scope of this article, an in depth evaluation
3.
RIC

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INFORMATION, AMERICAN PSYCHIAT-

ASSOCIATION, A PSYCHIATRIC GLOSSARY 129 (4th ed. 1975).
4. Id. at 137.
5. See id. at 147.
6. Id. at 63.
7. See cases cited supra note 1.
8. See cases cited supra note 1.
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of the courts' perceptions of antipsychotic drugs is presented.
The earliest of these right-to-refuse-treatment cases, Goedecke
v. State,9 was decided in 1979 by the Supreme Court of Colorado,
sitting en banc. The court held that, under state law, a civilly committed inpatient possesses the right to refuse antipsychotic medication. 10 Noting that the patient in question had been given Prolixin (a
commonly used antipsychotic drug) involuntarily, the court concluded:
Prolixin had been selected to alter his psychotic thought patterns
and to minimize his dangerousness.
Testimony at the hearing adduced that, aside from its behavior-modifying capacity, prolixin can generate such short-term side
effects as stiffness, shakiness, restlessness and dizziness. Moreover,
it was established that prolixin therapy can produce a long-term
neurological condition called tardive dyskinesia. This condition initially causes involuntary tongue and lip movement. It may progress
to involuntary movement of other muscles such as arm, shoulder
and trunk muscles, and may cause permanent disability. Indeed,
Goedecke's reason for refusing prolixin treatment was that he had
previously been treated with the drug and had experienced some of
its short-term adverse side effects, including passing out, falling
down, loss of breath, stiff tongue, disordered thinking and a feeling
like being "half dead."1 1
The decision, as demonstrated by this excerpt, focused on the
deleterious short and long term side effects of the antipsychotic medication, without carefully considering the drug's positive effects. The
court determined that Prolixin had been selected to "alter his
psychotic thought patterns, 1 2 but failed to recognize that this alteration was in the direction of normalcy. In addition, although the
court was aware of the behavior-modifying capacity of the medication, 13 it did not indicate that the behavior in question was, in fact,
derived from the psychotic illness. Thus, the implication appears to
be that other forms of behavior may have been affected as well. The
9. 198 Colo. 407, 603 P.2d 123 (1979) (en banc) (per curiam).
10. Id. at 412, 603 P.2d at 124-25. By depending on a state statute to uphold the inpa-

tient's right to refuse treatment, the court avoided the constitutional arguments. Id. at 411,
603 P.2d at 124.
II. Id. (emphasis added).
12. Id. The court did add that "[pirolixin had been selected ... to minimize [the
patient's] dangerousness," id., but did not explain that this may be achieved by alleviating the
symptoms of his mental illness.
13. Id.
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belief that antipsychotic medications can be used for sinister purposes of thought control, though not explicity stated in the opinion, is
implicit in the court's description of the effects of the drug.
Another 1979 case, Rogers v. Okin,14 probably the most influential right-to-refuse-treatment case to date, drew these conclusions in
a more direct manner. The federal district court opinion in Rogers,
in a section entitled "Anti-psychotic Drugs,"' 5 described these medications as follows:
Anti-psychotic drugs are chemical agents used to manage and
treat serious mental illness. . . .In general, the drugs influence
chemical transmissions to the brain, affecting both activatory and
inhibitory functions. Because the drugs' purpose is to reduce the
level of psychotic thinking, it is virtually undisputed that they are
mind-altering.
Foremost among the possible side effects of anti-psychotic
drugs is tardive dyskinesia. Tardive dyskinesia is a neurological
side effect which may appear after prolonged use of anti-psychotic
drug treatment. The disease [i.e., dyskinesia] is the outcome of a
complex patient-drug interaction which is not currently well
understood.1"
Additional attention was devoted to the short range effects of these
medications."
In a later section entitled "The Involuntary Patient's First
Amendment Rights,"1 8 the opinion took the right-to-refuse-treatment issue in a novel direction, elaborating on its characterization of
the medication as "mind-altering."
It is clear from the evidence in this case that psychotropic medication has the potential to affect and change a patient's mood, attitude and capacity to think. Such effects may well be considered by
the medical profession as positive steps on the road to recovery and
eventual release from the hospital. But, the validity of psychotropic
14. 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), affd in part, rev'd in part, vacated and remanded, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457

U.S. 291 (1982).
15. 478 F. Supp. at 1359.
16. Id. at 1360 (emphasis added). The court proceeded to list tardive dyskinesia's symptomatology in extensive detail. Id.
17. See id. These short term effects included "akathisia (motor restlessness-the inability to sit still), akinesia (physical immobility and lack of spontaneity), dystonia (spasmodic
muscle reaction frequently characterized by a twisting of the neck), and pseudoparkinsonian
syndrome (mask-like face, rigidity of the hand)." Id.
18. Id. at 1366.
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drugs as a reasonable course of medical treatment is not the core
issue here. At stake is the more fundamental question as to
whether the state may impose once again on the privacy of a person, already deprived of freedom through commitment, by forcibly
injecting mind-altering drugs into his system in a non-emergency
situation.
The right to produce a thought-or refuse to do so-is as important as the right protected in Roe v. Wade to give birth or
abort. ....Without the capacity to think, we merely exist, not
function. Realistically, the capacity to think and decide is a fundamental element of freedom.
The First Amendment protects the communication of ideas.
That protected right of communication presupposes a capacity to
produce ideas. .

.

.Whatever powers the Constitution has granted

our government, involuntary mind control is not one of them, absent extraordinary circumstances. The fact that mind control takes
place in a mental institution in the form of medically sound treatment of mental disease is not, itself, an extraordinary circumstance
warranting an unsanctioned intrusion on the integrity of a human
being.19
The implication of the court's reasoning is not only that the patient can have the content of his beliefs altered by psychotropic medication, not merely the psychotic structure of those beliefs, but also
that his thought can be entirely suppressed. The court thereby offered a vision of medication different from that of many other rightto-refuse-treatment decisions.
On appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals avoided the first
amendment argument by deciding the case on fourteenth amendment grounds.2 In reviewing the district court's discussion of the
effects of the various medications, the First Circuit appropriately
noted that the lower court had "focused extensively on the harmful
side effects" revealed by the record. 1 The circuit court correctly indicated that the record also showed that "in many situations, despite
the risks of harmful side effects, the administration of drugs to an
individual is clearly in his best interests because of the beneficial effects that the drugs can have, including the amelioration of the pa19. Id. at 1366-67 (emphasis added).
20. 634 F.2d 650, 653, 654 n.2 (1st Cir. 1980).
21. Id. at 660 (emphasis added). This phenomenon-courts emphasizing the adverse effects of the medications-may be related to the tendency of courts to be interested in harms,
since harms and not benefits are traditionally litigated.
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tient's illness." 22 Moreover, the court warned that the failure to medicate in such situations could produce deleterious results in and of
itself, such as "the unnecessary and possibly irreversible continuation
of [the patient's] illness." 23 Thus, the court emphasized the crucial
point-in the area of medication, inaction is itself a treatment decision and can, in fact, create more harmful effects than might result
from the involuntary administration of the drugs, The issue of
"mind-control" was never addressed by the circuit court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and subsequently remanded the case
to the First Circuit, where it now awaits resolution. 4
The district court's opinion in Rogers was cited with approval in
a 1980 Ohio federal district court case, Davis v. Hubbard,25 concerning the conditions at that state's main facility for the criminally insane, Lima State Hospital. The court addressed several issues under
the rubric of a right to treatment-ranging from staffing to room
size-and recognized the patients' right to refuse antipsychotic
medications. 28 These medications were discussed as follows:
The term psychotropic or "mood altering" drug describes several categories of major tranquilizers (also called antipsychotic or
neuroleptic drugs), antianxiety drugs (minor tranquilizers), antidepressants, sedatives, (e.g., barbituates), and hypnotics. None of
the psychotropic drugs cures mental illness, but each category of
produces distinct side
drugs serves a separate function, and each
2
effects and risk associated with its usage.
It is interesting to note that the Davis court's discussion of
psychotropics, similar to the district court in Rogers, stressed the absence of their curative effects, focused primarily on their adverse side
effects and minimized their mainly positive aspects. The court did,
however, in one passage, attest to the benefits of the drugs as follows:
Though there appears to be no generally accepted theory that
explains the biochemical manner in which the drugs work, the ben22.
23.

Id.
Id.

24. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982). In remanding the case to the First Circuit, the
Court instructed the circuit court to consider the effect of a recent Massachusetts case, In re

Roe, III, 383 Mass. 415, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1981), on the determination of state law claims.
Mills, 457 U.S. at 303-05. Roe will be discussed in detail below; see infra text accompanying

notes 50-63.
25.

506 F. Supp. 915, 929 (N.D. Ohio 1980).

26. See id. at 938 & n.32. The court stressed, however, that this was not an unlimited
right, but one which must be balanced against legitimate state interests. See id. at 934-38.

27. Id. at 927 (footnote omitted).
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eficial effects of antipsychotic drugs are on thought processes and
the brain's ability to sort out and integrate perceptions and memory. That is, they stabilize and blunt thought processes. For this
reason they are used most often in the treatment of schizophrenia
.... Though this Court is in no position to assess the claims that
have been averred as to the benefits of the drugs, it can at least be
said that psychotropic drugs are an effective method of treating
schizophrenic symptoms, and may thus enable patients to benefit
from other types of therapy. 8
Despite this apparently balanced assessment, the use of the
phrase, "stabilize and blunt thought processes," is indicative of the
court's ultimate miscomprehension of the drugs' true effects. Unlike
most decisions, however, the court can not be faulted with a complete ignorance of medical works concerning psychotropics, as legal
support for its propositions were interspersed with citations to medical authorities. 29 The court further stated that:
Accepting as true the general effectiveness of psychotropic
drugs, it is nonetheless clear that they may not be helpful in every
case. Further, there is at present neither an accurate method of
predicting how a patient will react to a particular drug, . . .nor
any accepted criteria for deciding what drug within a particular
class and in what amount to prescribe. Most disturbing, however, is
that all antipsychotic drugs can cause side effects which are "as
varied and serious as any pharmaceuticals approved for clinical use
in the United States."30
Although the Davis court offered a more balanced view of antipsychotic medications than earlier cases, it should be observed that the
court engaged in an extensive discussion of the negative effects of the
drugs, while devoting far less attention to their positive effects.3"
After a lengthy analysis of the case law relating to civil liberties
and the right of privacy of one's own body,3 2 the court reached the
implications of its earlier remarks: 33
Aside from a person's interest in "physical security" and in
making decisions about how his body will be used or abused, the
28.
29.
30.
31.
Roe, II,
32.
33.

Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 927-28 (citations omitted).
This disproportion will be brought out even more strikingly in a later case, In re
383 Mass. 415, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1981); see infra text accompanying notes 50-63.
See Davis, 506 F. Supp. at 929-33.
See supra text accompanying note 27.
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forced administration of psychotropic drugs implicates a person's
interest in being able to think and to communicate freely. The notion that the State cannot punish or deprive a person because of his
thought or beliefs has long been beyond dispute. "The fantasies of
a drug addict are his own, and beyond the reach of the state. .. "
Though it is at least arguable that "treatment" at LSH [the subject hospital] has on occasion been administered for no purpose
other than to punish inmates for their thoughts, the inmates' principal interest affected in the present case arises not from the State's
attempts to punish thoughts but its attempts to use treatment as a
means of controllingthought, either by inhibitingan inmate's ability to think or by coercing acceptance of particularthoughts and

beliefs....
. . . Under this view, government action which directly affects
the mental processes would be unconstitutional under the First

Amendment."

Thus, as in the district court's opinion in Rogers,35 the effect of these
medications is seen as changing, and hence controlling, an individual's thoughts in a manner similar to brainwashing or to "thought
control" in an Orwellian sense. Relying on this misconception, the
Davis court not surprisingly concluded that: "Given the significant
invasion of fundamental interests3 61 that the forced use of psychotropic drugs represents, the risk of danger which the State has a
legitimate interest in protecting against must be sufficiently grave
and imminent to permit their coerced use."' 7 The court further
stated that "[t]hese drugs quite often cause pain and serious, long
term, if not permanent, side effects. They deaden the patient's ability to think and their forced administration is an affront to basic
concepts of human dignity."" Thus, the fallacious spectre of mind
control permeated the opinion and formed the critical ground upon
which the court based its constitutional analysis.
Another important decision, recognizing a qualified constitutional right to refuse treatment, is Rennie v. Klein.3a In that case,
34.

Id. at 933 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

35. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), afid in part, rev'd in part,
vacated and remanded,634 F.2d 650 (Ist Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub nom. Mills v.
Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982).

36.

The constitutionally protected fundamental interests included "'bodily integrity,'"

"'personal dignity,'" independent decision making, free thought, and communication. See Davis, 506 F. Supp. at 930, 934.

37.

Id. at 934 (footnote omitted).

38.

Id. at 936 (emphasis added).

39.

476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979).
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the court adopted and incorporated its findings of fact from an earlier related case: 40 "[W]hile psychotropic drug treatment had shown
considerable success, recent studies had raised questions about the
efficacy of using psychotropics in every case of mental illness. '41 The
court also concluded, from the record presently before it, that many
patients could improve either without being treated with psychotropics or by taking smaller doses than traditionally administered.4
The dangerous side effects the court gleaned from the record included tardive dyskinesia, cancer, and the inhibited "ability to learn
' 43
social skills needed to fully recover from psychosis. '
In apparently describing the function of psychotropic medications, the court found that "[t]he drugs are most useful in diffusing
schizophrenic thought patterns during acute psychotic episodes."' 4 It
is unclear what the court was trying to convey by its use of the term
"diffusing." Arguably, this term may have been chosen for its pejorative connotations, as opposed to other language, which might have
conveyed a more curative or normalizing effect of the medications.
Relying on Rennie, as well as other authorities, the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma decided In re K.K.B. 45 The court's initial statements about the patient's illness and its treatment are as follows:
K.K.B. is suffering from schizophrenia, the etiology of which is not
known. There are no physical symptoms and no physical basist46 J
for schizophrenia. . . .It is the most likely disorder to be treated
with psychotropic drugs, but the precise nature of the benefits of
these drugs is as yet uncertain and the dangers the drugs seek to
avoid are usually not great. Psychotropic drugs do not cure schizophrenia and patients rarely recover, but merely go into remission
40.

Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978).

41. Rennie, 476 F. Supp. at 1298.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1299.
44. Id. at 1298.
45. 609 P.2d 747 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1980).
46. Recent studies suggest that at least a subgroup of schizophrenics may in fact have
physical concomitants. See, e.g., Golden, Graber, Coffman, Berg, Newlin & Bloch, Structural
Brain Deficits in Schizophrenia,38 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1014 (1981); Golden, Moses,
Zelazowski, Graber, Zatz, Horvath & Berger, Cerebral Ventricular Size and Neuropsychological Impairment in Young Chronic Schizophrenics, 37 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 619

(1980); Levin, Jones, Stark, Merrin & Holzman, Identificationof Abnormal Patternsin Eye
Movements of Schizophrenic Patients, 39 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1125 (1982); Luchins,
Weinberger & Wyatt, Schizophrenia and CerebralAsymmetry Detected by Computed Tomography, 139 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 753 (1982); Mathew, Duncan, Weinman & Barr, Regional Cerebral Blood Flow in Schizophrenia, 39 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1121 (1982);
Stevens, Neuropathology of Schizophrenia, 39 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1131 (1982).
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which can also be spontaneous without the use of drugs.""
Thus, by citing to the allegedly minor dangers of schizophrenia, by
emphasizing the absence of a cure for this illness, and by pointing to
spontaneous remission-a regrettably rare event-as though it were
an average expectable outcome, the court has substantially minimized the seriousness of the patient's illness. The court further
noted: "Unfortunately rather unpleasant primary and side effects
often accompany the use of psychotropic drugs which many people
would prefer to avoid even at the risk of continuing mental
disorder. ' 8
No mention is made of any empirical basis for this potentially
important conclusion concerning people's preferences. This conclusion may have been derived, however, from the negative effects associated with these drugs. The corresponding footnote to the above
quotation is enlightening as to the court's underlying reasoning:
Testimony at trial, judicial decisions and commentators point to
many rather toxic and severe primary and side effects accompanying the use of psychotropic drugs such as: dysfunction of the central nervous system called extra pyramidal symptoms; blurred vision, dry mouth and throat, constipation or diarrhea, palpitation,
skin rashes, low blood pressure, faintness, fatigue; also sometimes
permanent states such as akinesia, akathesia [sic] and tardive dyskinesia characterized by rhythmical, repetitive involuntary movements of the tongue, face, mouth or jaw sometimes accompanied
by other bizarre muscular activity. Also they may be responsible
for a condition wherein white blood cells disappear9 called agranulocytosis which is fatal in 30%, [sic] of the cases.4
It is interesting to note that the court again emphasized the negative
properties of psychotropics through an extensive list of side effects,
but ignored the potential that the medications have of reversing the
original symptoms of the illness.
Factually distinguishable from the foregoing cases is In re Roe,
111,50 a Massachusetts case, where the patient in question was an
outpatient rather than an involuntarily committed inpatient. The issue addressed by the court was whether a guardian could authorize
the use of antipsychotic medication against the patient's will. The
47.
48.
49.
50.

In re K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747, 748 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1980) (footnote omitted).
Id. (footnote omitted).
Id. at 748 n.3 (citations omitted).
383 Mass. 415, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1981).
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court held that, absent an emergency
situation, only a judge, using a
"substituted judgment" standard,5 1 could make such a decision.5 2
In its opinion, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court offered several conceptualizations of the effects of antipsychotic medications. The most telling of these depictions was the court's initial
definition of an antipsychotic drug: "[A] powerful, mind-altering
drug which is accompanied by often severe and sometimes irreversible adverse side effects." 53 Of particular interest in this threshold
definition is the absence of any mention of beneficial effects, except
possibly by inference from the ambiguous notion of "mind-altering."
The Roe court most closely addressed the question of medication in a section of its opinion entitled "The Decision to Administer
Antipsychotic Drugs to the Ward.""' The court commented:
A single injection of Haldol, one of the antipsychotic drugs proposed in this case, can be effective for ten to fourteen days. [It is
apparent to a specialist that the court has confused Haldol with
Prolixin.] The drugs arepowerful enough to immobilize mind and
body. Because of both the profound effect that these drugs have on

the thought processes of an individual and the well-established
likelihood of severe and irreversible adverse side effects, .

.

. we

treat these drugs in the same manner we would treat psychosurgery
or electroconvulsive therapy .... 155] While the actual physical invasion involved in the administration of these drugs amounts to no
more than an injection, the impact of the chemicals upon the brain
is sufficient to undermine the foundations of personality.5"

The court proceeded to review the effects of medication with an
extremely heavy and disproportionate emphasis on the negative effects. Extensive reference was made to a controversial law review
article by Robert Plotkin,57 while citations to psychopharmacological
51. Under the "substituted judgment" standard, the judge must decide what the incompetent would choose to do if he or she were competent. See id. at 430-32, 436-40, 421 N.E.2d
at 51-52, 56-59.
52. See id. at 442, 421 N.E.2d at 61.
53. Id. at 418, 421 N.E.2d at 42.
54. Id. at 428, 421 N.E.2d at 50.
55. The court here cited, inter alia, Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental
Patients' Right to Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw. U.L. RaV. 461, 466-74 (1977); see also infra
note 57.
56. Roe, 383 Mass. at 431-33, 421 N.E.2d at 52-53 (emphasis added).
57. Plotkin, supra note 55. While this article has been cited in a number of decisions on
the right to refuse treatment, its influence appears disproportionate to the validity of its conclusions, which are drawn from a highly selective review of the psychopharmacological literature and which emphasize negative effects of medication in a distorted and inaccurate manner.
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literature were relatively sparse.58
The Roe court acknowledged that antipsychotic drugs could
"lessen the amount and intensity of psychotic thinking,"5 9 but, nevertheless, maintained that "among the most important reasons for
their continued use is to control behavior,"60 citing Plotkin for authority. In addition to these "extreme intended" effects, the court
also emphasized that the drugs have "frequently devastating and
often irreversible" unintended effects. 6 ' After quoting several pages
from Plotkin's article, in which the author discusses the many adverse effects of antipsychotics, 62 the court concluded that "[c]ommentators and courts have found that antipsychotic drugs are highrisk treatment."63
Although the authors admit that the brief foregoing review does
not adequately treat the complexity and detail of these varying opinions--encompassing as they do a wide variety of clinical and legal
situations-it is, nevertheless, our hope that the quality and flavor of
judicial portrayals of the effects of medication has been manifested.
In particular, the most important features are the tendency of the
courts to view the medications' adverse side effects as more prominent than their primary effects and to believe, apart from their normalizing influences on psychotic symptomatology, that these medications can negatively alter the manner in which people think.
Interestingly, these decisions on the right to refuse treatment
ignore the large body of judicial decisions in the criminal law concerning the effect of antipsychotic medications. These latter cases
present quite a different view of antipsychotic drugs.
II.

PERCEPTIONS OF ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUG ACTION IN CRIMINAL
CASES

In many of the cases that follow, a mentally ill defendant has
been treated with antipsychotic drugs to enable him both to properly
See Appelbaum & Gutheil, "Rotting With Their Rights On": Constitutional Theory and
ClinicalReality in Drug Refusal by PsychiatricPatients, 7 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY &
L. 306 (1979); Mills & Gutheil, Guardianshipand the Right to Refuse Treatment: A Critique of the Roe Case, 9 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 239, 244 (1981); Intervenor's
Petition for Rehearing, In re Roe, III, 383 Mass. 415, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1981).
58. Roe, 383 Mass. at 433-35, 421 N.E.2d at 52-54.
59. Id. at 434, 421 N.E.2d at 53.
60. Id. (footnote omitted).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 434-35, 421 N.E.2d at 53-54.
63. Id. at 435, 421 N.E.2d at 54. Although the court cited various authorities to support
this statement, it virtually ignored the psychopharmacological literature to the contrary.
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assist his attorney and to understand the proceedings against him."6
Often these defendants allege insanity as a defense-admitting that
they committed the crime in question but claiming that they were
legally "insane" during its commission. These defendants argue,
therefore, that they are entitled to present their true demeanor and
mental disposition before the jury and have a right to be tried unmedicated.63 A leading case often cited by defendants in support of
their alleged right to be tried without state imposed medication is
64. The requisite two-pronged test which determines a defendant's competence to stand
trial requires that the defendant have "'sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding'" and that he have "'a rational as well as
factual understanding of the proceedings against him.'" See, e.g., Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S.
162, 170 n.7 (1975) (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960)). This definition of
competence to stand trial is not necessarily tantamount to a generalized nonlegal notion of
mental competency.
65. Various courts have therefore acknowledged a right in defendants either to be tried
in an unmedicated state, e.g., Commonwealth v. Louraine, 390 Mass. 28, 453 N.E.2d 437
(1983), or to inform the jury of the fact that the medication is being administered during trial,
e.g., State v. Hayes, 118 N.H. 458, 389 A.2d 1379 (1978); In re Pray, 133 Vt. 253, 336 A.2d
174 (1975). Although it is not directly relevant to the main thesis of this article, the authors
feel compelled to comment upon a flaw in the courts' reasoning in the cases allowing defendants to forego competency-restoring medication during trial.
The basic underlying premise relied on by the courts in this area is that a jury, which
must decide whether a defendant was "insane" during the commission of the offense, could be
influenced by how that defendant looks and acts in court during trial. See, e.g., In re Pray, 133
Vt. 253, 257-58, 336 A.2d 174, 177 (1975). Therefore, the medication given during trial,
which is the sole means by which psychotic defendants are able to understand the proceedings
against them, appears to be viewed as interfering with the jury's capacity to determine the
defendants' sanity at a completely different time, i.e., when the offense was committed.
To illuminate the inherent flaw in this reasoning, however, let us assume that a psychotic
individual commits a crime and then, during the long delay before trial, undergoes a spontaneous recovery, completely without the assistance of any medication. When the jury observes the
defendant's trial demeanor (sometime after the crime), it is not seeing that individual in the
same state as at the time of the crime. Yet, as in many other situations, the jury is expected to
attempt to conceptualize the accused as he was at the time of the incident in order to assess
whether he was then insane. In this scenario, the defendant clearly fails to resemble "who he
was at the time of the crime," but nevertheless, the state of sanity at the time of the crime is
the only issue.
This set of facts should be indistinguishable from the situation where the defendant's state
of sanity during trial is achieved through .the administration of antipsychotic drugs. Of course,
in either circumstance, the jury would be required to evaluate the defendant's sanity at the
time of the crime, which can be proved through evidence such as expert testimony. We do not
question the courts' determinatidn of the legal issues implicated by these facts, such as
whether a defendant may be forced to be treated with medication during trial, or to what
extent such treatment may inhibit a defendant's constitutional right to present evidence, see
Commonwealth v. Louraine, 390 Mass. 28, 34-39, 453 N.E.2d 437, 441-44 (1983). Nonetheless, we believe that based on the factual issues involved, the more sensible resolution of the
problem is to allow the state to administer proper medication to assist defendants in understanding the proceedings against them, while at the same time affording defendants the opportunity to inform juries fully as to the effects of the drugs.
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State v. Maryott.66
Since the defendant in Maryott was treated with sedative medication, rather than with traditional antipsychotics, 67 the case is considered here merely to show how and why other courts have distinguished it when analyzing the effects of antipsychotics6 8
In Maryott, the questions before the Washington Court of Appeals were whether the state had the right, over the defense counsel's
objection, to administer drugs which affect the defendant's mental
and/or physical ability at the time of trial; and particularly, whether
the state may do so where the defendant's mental responsibility to
commit the crime is at issue, i.e., the insanity defense.6 9 The court
held that the state was prohibited from forcing the drugs upon the
defendant in either situation."0
During Maryott's trial, jail officials gave him substantial doses
of Sparine, a very weak antipsychotic with primarily sedative quali72
ties;"' Librium, a minor tranquilizer with no antipsychotic effect;
and chloral hydrate, a sedative hypnotic.7 3 Expert testimony given
before the appellate court indicated that "the dosages administered
would affect the thought, expression, manner and content of the person using the drugs."17 4 In addition, at trial, the defendant was "observed to be sitting hunched over, staring vacantly ahead," 75 unlike
and unhis usual self, and was, according to his lawyer, "suspicious
76
defense."1
his
in
assist
to
refused
and
communicative
Although the defendant had a history of emotional illness, it is
66.

6 Wash. App. 96, 492 P.2d 239 (1971).

67. The defendant was given Sparine, Librium, and chloral hydrate, id. at 97, 492 P.2d
at 240, all having primarily sedative effects.
68. State v. Murphy, 56 Wash. 2d 761, 355 P.2d 323 (1960), is also often relied upon
by defendants claiming a right to be tried unmedicated. See, e.g., State v. Law, 270 S.C. 664,

244 S.E.2d 302 (1978). The drugs at issue in Murphy, however, were tranquilizers rather than
antipsychotics. In addition, these drugs were given to the defendant, by a fellow prisoner serving under the supervision of the jail physician, to treat the defendant's "severe cold," and not

because the defendant was psychotic. Id. at 765, 355 P.2d at 325. This case should therefore
be distinguished in the same manner in which the courts have distinguished Maryolt; see infra

text and accompanying notes 84-102.
69.

Maryott, 6 Wash. App. at 97, 492 P.2d at 240.

70. Id.
DERS

71. D. KLEIN & J.
52-66 (1969).

DAVIS, DIAGNOSIS AND DRUG TREATMENT OF PSYCHIATRIC DISOR-

72. R. BALDESSARINI, CHEMOTHERAPY IN PSYCHIATRY 126-46 (1977).
73. THE MERCK INDEX: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHEMICALS AND DRUGS 260 (M.
Windholz 9th ed. 1976).
74. Maryott, 6 Wash. App. at 97, 492 P.2d at 240.
75.

Id.

76. Id.
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not clear from the case precisely why he was given these drugs. It
may reasonably be inferred from the court's opinion, however, that
the medication was not administered to restore or enhance the defendant's competence to stand trial. First, in determining the defendant's competency, the court found that the evidence showed he was
competent despite the medication." Second, in searching for a possible state interest for imposing the drugs upon an unwilling defendant, the court failed to mention competence restoration; rather, it
presumed that the state's purpose was "to control a possibly obstrep78
erous defendant."
Given this possible state interest, the court held that the defendant had been denied due process by being forced to take the
drugs. 7 The court analogized to several old cases which held that
defendants could not be chained or shackled in court because doing
so would subject them to physical pain and thereby inhibit their
mental faculties.8 0 The court applied this reasoning in the case
before it, concluding that:
The application of the principles gleaned from the cases involving chaining and shackling to cases involving forced intake of
drugs is, we believe, a difference only in degree and not in substance. To apply the historical concerns about shackling to cases
involving drugs, which may have these same or more deleterious
effects, is only to give a more current application to a basic
81
concern.
When considering the effects of sedative medication, clinicians
would have little quarrel with the basis of this reasoning, despite the
extremism of the "drugs equal chains" comparison. The court's failure, however, to elucidate the distinction between competence-impairing sedatives and competence-restoring antipsychotics is demonstrated by the following passage of the opinion:
The court could at one time say with confidence, "Freedom to
think is absolute of its own nature; the more tyrannical government
is powerless to control the inward workings of the mind." Jones v.
Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 618 . . . (1942). The development of
psychochemicals since that opinion in 1942 raises a question
about the degree of assurance with which Mr. Justice Murphy
77. See id. at 105, 492 P.2d at 244.
78. Id. at 103, 492 P.2d at 243.
79. Id. at 100-01, 492 P.2d at 242.
80. Id. at 98-100, 492 P.2d at 241-42.
81. Id. at 100, 492 P.2d at 242.
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could make that statement today.8 2

The use of neologism "psychochemicals" invites confusion between
sedatives apparently referred to here and antipsychotics. As will be
illustrated in the cases that follow,83 this is an absolutely essential
distinction.
In State v. Hayes,8 a defendant, whose competence to stand
trial was dependent upon his being treated with antipsychotic drugs,
claimed a right to be tried in his unmedicated state. The New
Hampshire Supreme Court ruled that he lacked an absolute right to
be tried free from the influence of drugs, 85 distinguishing Maryott
because:
Maryott apparently was based on evidence that the drugs there involved "would affect the thought, expression, manner and content
of the person using the drugs. . ....
In the case before us there is no evidence that the drugs administered to the defendant affected the process or contents of his
thoughts. To the contrary, all the evidence indicates that the drugs
used here allow the cognitive part of the defendant's brain, which
has been altered by the mental disease, to come back into play.

All the expert evidence supports the conclusion that the medication
has a beneficial effect on the defendant's ability to function and
that without the medication he is incompetent to stand trial. There
is no evidence that the defendant's competence to stand trial can be
maintained by less intrusive treatment techniques.86
In State v. Jojola, 7 the Court of Appeals of New Mexico was
presented with precisely the same issue as in Hayes. The defendant,
who had a long history of mental illness, was found to be psychotic,
and to be suffering from a "schizophrenia of the paranoid type."88
The evidence showed that with the help of Thorazine, the defendant's condition was "in a state of remission."89 In particular, the
"effect of Thorazine was described as inhibiting or depressing the
emotional part of the brain and allowing the cognitive part to come
back into play."90 In light of this evidence, the lower court found the
82. Id. at 98, 492 P.2d at 240-41 (emphasis added).
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

See cases discussed infra text and accompanying notes 84-103.
118 N.H. 458, 389 A.2d 1379 (1978).
Id. at 462, 389 A.2d at 1381.
Id. at 461, 389 A.2d at 1381 (emphasis added).
89 N.M. 489, 553 P.2d 1296 (Ct. App. 1976).
Id. at 491, 553 P.2d at 1298.

89. Id.
90. Id.
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defendant competent to stand trial, contingent on the medication,
and the defendant did not refute this finding on appeal. 91
The defendant did contend, however, that he had "an absolute
right to be tried free from the influence of Thorazine, ' '9 2 relying primarily on Maryott for support of his position.93 The court of appeals,
however, rejected Maryott for the same reasons that Hayes did, finding that:
There is no evidence that Thorazine affected defendant's thought
processes or the content of defendant's thoughts; the affirmative evidence is that Thorazine allows the cognitive part of the brain to
come back into play. The expert witnesses declined to call
Thorazine a mind altering drug. "Rather, Thorazine allows the
mind to operate as it might were there not some organic or other
type of illness affecting the mind."' 94
Consistent with the decisions in both Hayes and Jojola is State
v. Law,95 in which the defendant also claimed it was error to try him
while he was under the influence of psychotropic medication. In Law,
the defendant also cited Maryott,98 among other cases,97 for support
of his contention that the medication inhibited his proof of an insanity defense.98
The Law court also found Maryott inapposite, 99 declaring that
"medication may be administered without the consent of a defendant
.... where the medication is necessary to render a defendant competent to stand trial." 100 Specifically addressing the issue of competency, the court concluded from the medical testimony that "the
psychotropic medications administered to the appellant do depress
and control the symptoms [of schizophrenia], thus calming the schizophrenic and allowing him to organize his thought processes and
think more rationally. The medication brings on a state of remission
by countering the psychotic effects of the active state." 10 1 The court
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
355 P.2d
98.
99.
100.
101.

See id.
Id. at 492, 553 P.2d at 1299.
Id.
Id.
270 S.C. 664, 244 S.E.2d 302 (1978).
Id. at 672, 244 S.E.2d at 306.
In re Pray, 133 Vt. 253, 336 A.2d 174 (1975); State v. Murphy, 56 Wash. 2d 761,
323 (1960).
Law, 270 S.C. at 672, 244 S.E.2d at 306-07.
Id. at 672, 244 S.E.2d at 306.
Id. at 674, 244 S.E.2d at 307.
Id. at 670, 244 S.E.2d at 305.
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further noted:
The consensus of the medical testimony at both the competency
hearing and trial indicated that the psychotropic medications had
positive effects, reversing the active state and allowing [the appellant] to function in a more rational manner. While it is true the
medications do affect cognitive and communicative processes, the
effect is beneficial in that it enabled the appellant to effectively [assist counsel and confront the witnesses against him]. °2
Thus, Hayes, Jojola, and Law all recognized the competencyrestoring qualities of antipsychotic drugs and appropriately distinguished this medication from the sedatives used on the defendant in
Maryott.103 In addition, various other courts have generally identified the capacity of antipsychotic medication to enable a defendant
to understand the proceedings against him.1 04 In State v. Rand,105
for example, a mentally ill defendant being voluntarily treated with
phenothiazine medication (the antipsychotics Stelazine and Thorazine), 10 8 insisted that he was competent to be tried on outstanding
murder charges. The court cited expert testimony confirming the stabilizing effect of the medication and ruled that the defendant was
competent to stand trial under proper administration of the drugs. 0
This notion of competence contingent solely upon proper medication has been addressed in detail by several other courts under the
rubric of "synthetic sanity."10 8 One such case is State v. Hamp102. Id. at 671, 244 S.E.2d at 306.
103. In the recent case of Commonwealth v. Louraine, 390 Mass. 28, 453 N.E.2d 437
(1983), the court held that the defendant was entitled to be tried in his unmedicated state to
facilitate proof of his insanity defense. The court based its decision, however, on legal principles such as a defendant's constitutional right to present evidence, rather than on the actual
effects of antipsychotic drugs. In addition, although the court cited Maryot with approval, it
relied solely upon Maryott's legal analysis, rather than on its medical evaluations and presumptions. The court made no independent judgment on the effects of antipsychotic drugs on
mentation.
104. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Blair, 491 Pa. 499, 421 A.2d 656 (1980) (evidence
adduced to the effect that administration of medication did not prevent defendant from understanding the trial proceedings or assisting his counsel; administration of medication, even when
required to sustain competency, does not preclude a determination of trial competency); Commonwealth v. Tyson, 485 Pa. 344, 402 A.2d 995 (1979) (defendant satisfied trial competency
standards of ability to understand his position in the proceedings and cooperate with counsel,
even though he required medication to maintain that competency).
105. 20 Ohio Misc. 98, 247 N.E.2d 342 (Ct. C.P. 1969).
106. See id. at 103, 247 N.E.2d at 345.
107. Id. at 103-08, 247 N.E.2d 345-49.
108. See cases discussed infra text and accompanying notes 109-24.
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ton,109 involving a schizophrenic defendant treated with Thorazine to
help restore her sanity. Evidence produced at the defendant's competency hearing showed that "her psychotic symptoms were in remission," 110 as a result of the Thorazine treatment, but that "if the dos-

age were discontinued, she would probably relapse."111 Although the
defendant was deemed legally sane by two members of the "sanity
commission," ' the trial judge found that she was "only 'synthetically sane,'-"113 concluding that "trial capacity induced by medication was insufficient." 114 The judge, therefore, ruled that the defendant was "insane, or incompetent" and remanded her to a
11 5
hospital.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Louisiana astutely disagreed.
The court ruled that the fact that the defendant's psychotic symptoms were in remission as a result of prescribed medication was of
"no legal consequence."116 It reasoned that a court should look "to
the condition only," 117 and should not "look beyond existing competency and erase improvement produced by medical science."' 1 8
Hence, the higher court had no difficulty in grasping the notion of
restored competence as valid competence, and in expressing it in a
9
lucid and oft-cited way."'
The concept of synthetic sanity was also addressed in Virgin Islands v. Crowe.'20 The defendant in Crowe raised the question "of
whether an accused whose mental capability can be maintained only
through [Thorazine treatment] may nonetheless be deemed competent to stand trial." 21 The court answered this question in the affirmative, citing Hampton with approval.122 In addition, the court
relied on expert testimony that the drug "would enhance the defen109. 253 La. 399, 218 So. 2d 311 (1969).
110. Id. at 401-02, 218 So. 2d at 311-12.
111. Id. at 402, 218 So. 2d at 311-12.
112. Id. at 401, 218 So. 2d at 311.
113. Id. at 402, 218 So. 2d at 312 (discussing the findings of the trial court).
114. Id.
115. Id. (noting the trial court's ruling). The court considered the concepts of "sanity"
and "competency to stand trial" as being equivalent, since the sole issue in the case was
whether the defendant was competent to stand trial. See id. at 402, 218 So. 2d at 311.
116. Id. at 403, 218 So. 2d at 312.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. E.g., State v. Potter, 285 N.C. 238, 204 S.E.2d 649 (1974); see People v. Parsons,
82 Misc. 2d 1090, 371 N.Y.S.2d 840 (Nassau County Ct. 1975).
120. 391 F.Supp. 987 (D.V.I. 1975).
121. Id. at 988.
122. See Id. at 989.
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dant's ability to perceive the trial proceedings, ' 123 and specifically
noted that "thorazine is used primarily to suppress anxiety in the
patient and thus effects [sic] the emotional rather than the cognitive
processes of the individual." 24
The cases discussed thus far in this section have generally
demonstrated the willingness of courts in criminal cases to highlight
the primary effects of antipsychotics and to give little or no attention
to the alleged adverse secondary or mind-altering effects. In United
States ex rel Bornholdt v. Ternullo, 125 however, the court specifically addressed the impact that certain physical side effects may
have on a defendant's competency during trial.126 In Ternullo, a convicted murderer challenged the constitutionality of his state conviction in federal court, claiming that he had been under the influence
of medications during jury selection and, thus, was incompetent to
stand trial. 27
The petitioner was diagnosed as "a remissive schizophrenic, 1 28
and was administered Prolixin "to counteract [his] extreme agitation
and anxiety. 1' 29 He was also given Artane, which the court noted,
"caused side effects, such as excessive salivation, tremors of the
123. Id.
124. Id. In addition to these cases dealing with "synthetic sanity," People v. De Anda,
114 Cal. App. 3d 480, 170 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 990 (1981), brought
forth the notion of "synthetic safety," or, more properly, treatment-contingent "non-dangerousness". The De Anda court determined whether a defendant had recovered his sanity sufficiently to forego state imposed temporary incarceration. It stated that:
IT]he trial court . . . found both that defendant had not recovered his sanity and
that he was still a danger to himself or others. From the evidence presented it is
apparent that defendant still needed antipsychotic medication and therapy and that
he had not "fully recovered his sanity." Without this medication and therapy there
was a possibility that defendant could become dangerous. Since the purpose of commitment under section 1026 is "to protect the defendant and the public during the
period necessary to appraise the defendant's present sanity" . . .
psychopharmaceutical restoration of sanity should not be considered a "full" recovery within the meaning of section 1026 ....
Id. at 490, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 835 (citation omitted). Thus, when the court concluded that this
psychopharmaceutical restoration of sanity is not "full" sanity, it apparently meant that treatment-contingent non-dangerousness is not sufficiently reliable to suit the court so as to grant
the defendant's release. Given the seriousness of the crime with which the defendant was
charged-assault with a deadly weapon-such a conclusion would find little objection from
clinicians, experienced in varieties of noncompliance with treatment. Nevertheless, the court
does appear to have confused the concepts of sanity and safety.
125. 402 F. Supp. 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
126. See id. at 376-77.
127. Id. at 375.
128. Id. at 376.
129. Id.
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hands, a mask-like facial appearance, and a shuffling gait."130 The
doctor who testified at the competency hearing "emphasized, however, that these drugs had no effect on petitioner's memory or cognitive faculties." 13 ' This last remark, of course, demonstrates the numerous opportunities for misunderstanding in this area. The drugs
were not given because they had no effect on the cognitive faculties;
rather, the doctor obviously meant that they had no deleterious or
impairing effect.
In any event, the federal district court did uphold the state trial
court's finding of competency.132 The district court noted that, although the petitioner's attorney found his client's "concentration
somewhat impaired during jury selection due to petitioner's preoccupation with his physical symptoms," 1 33 marked improvement was acknowledged as the proceedings progressed. 3 Moreover, all of the
evidence indicated to the court that "while the medication may have
had some discomforting physical effects upon petitioner, it did not
affect or impair his cognitive faculties."1 5 Thus, the court recognized that even physically visible side effects of the motor variety do
not automatically vitiate a person's competent status.
Based on the foregoing brief review of cases,138 it can be observed that the courts in the criminal area: (1) have generally attested to the competence-restoring capacity of antipsychotic drugs;
(2) have failed to cite so-called mind-altering effects; and (3) when
actually analyzing physical side effects, have concluded that they
have little impairment on normal mentation.
130. Id. Clinicians might quibble, however, that the court failed to address and to portray clearly the role of the anti-side-effect medication, Artane, whose only possible function
would be to ameliorate the side effects of Prolixin.
131. Id. (emphasis added).
132. Id. at 377.
133. Id. at 376.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 377 (footnote omitted).
136. Although this review of cases concerning the effect of antipsychotic medication on
competency to stand trial is representative of recent appellate decisions on the issue, it should
be noted that some states may still bar defendants from standing trial when their continued
competency is dependent on the administration of medication. As of 1976, some courts in at
least 13 states still followed a version of the "automatic bar rule," which requires defendants
to be free of medication at the time of trial. Appellate review of this practice has been infrequent but, as indicated in the review above, appellate courts have generally supported the use
of psychotropic medication to restore patients' competency. See Winick, Psychotropic Medication and Competency to Stand Trial, 1977 Am. B. FoUND. RESEARCH J. 769, 772-75.
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III.

MEDICAL ANALYSIS

The criminal courts that have had an opportunity to consider
the effects of antipsychotic drugs on mentation of defendants have
often reached remarkably different conclusions than those civil
courts that have addressed the right of psychiatric patients to refuse
psychotropic medication. Whereas the former have often recognized
a primary normalizing effect of the medications, 3 7 the latter have
frequently attributed to the drugs the capacity to affect adversely
many of the most basic functions of the mind.1 8
It is conceivable that the difference in the underlying subject
matter before these courts may have led them to perceive the effects
of psychotropics differently. In the criminal area, courts are generally suspicious of defendants attempting to avoid or overturn convictions on the basis of impaired competency (caused by the medications) at the time of trial. In contrast, in the civil area, courts are
usually concerned about possible ill effects of forced treatment on
hospitalized psychiatric patients. Yet, it is an inadequate justification
of these divergent views merely to note that they support the probable biases of the reviewing courts. The same medications are at issue
in each set of cases. Either their effects extend beyond the mere alleviation of psychotic symptoms or they do not. Either they adversely
affect mentation or they do not. Courts should, at the very least,
start their legal analysis, whether it be criminal or civil, on the basis
of a common set of factual presumptions concerning psychotropics.
The authors are unaware of any review in either medical or legal literature that attempts to synthesize the diverse strands of research on the effects of antipsychotic drugs on mentation. Thus, the
review that follows represents an initial effort in that direction and is
designed to allow as definitive an answer as is currently possible to
the question of the potential effects on mentation by these medications. It is hoped that courts in both criminal and civil cases will be
able to base their future conclusions on this pool of data.
A.

Effects of Antipsychotic Medications on Psychotic
Symptomatology

Antipsychotic medications were initially introduced in the
United States in the mid-1950's. The first of these medications,
chlorpromazine (often known by its trade name, Thorazine), was a
137. See supra notes 84-124 and accompanying text.
138.

See supra notes 9-63 and accompanying text.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1983

23

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 3
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:77

member of the phenothiazine class of compounds, from which most
other antipsychotic drugs have been derived. 3 9 Other classes of
medications, including the butyrophenones, thioxanthenes, dihydroindolones, and dibenzoxapines, were subsequently found to share
similar clinical properties.
It is indisputable that these antipsychotic medications revolutionized the treatment of the severely mentally ill. For the first time,
a treatment was available that directly eliminated many of the most
prominent symptoms of psychotic illness. Early studies demonstrated
that the drugs specifically reduced auditory hallucinations as well as
other hallucinations, delusions, 140 disordered thought processes, agitation, withdrawal, and other symptoms of psychotic illnesses such as
schizophrenia.1 41 As of this date, a host of studies, far too numerous
to be reviewed in detail here, have confirmed the utility of antipsychotic medications in psychotic mental disorders.1 42 Not only do the
medications have an ameliorative effect on many clinically important
symptoms, but when treatment has been successful, discontinuation
143
of the medication will often lead to a relapse of the illness.
As a result of the introduction of chlorpromazine and related
compounds, hospital treatment of severe mental disorders, particularly schizophrenia, has been dramatically altered. Control of the
more florid manifestations of their illnesses has allowed patients to
participate in rehabilitation and treatment programs designed to permit their release from institutional care.14 4 In 1955, the year following the introduction of chlorpromazine in this country, more than
558,000 patients were committed to state mental institutions. This
figure represented the highest recorded number in recent history. By
139.
140.

See generally R.

BALDESSARINI, CHEMOTHERAPY IN PSYCHIATRY 12-56 (1977).
Delusions are fixed ideas not amenable to rational explanation. They are main-

tained against logical argument despite objective contradictory evidence. SUBCOMMITTEE OF
THE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INFORMATION, AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra note

3, at 41.
141. See, e.g., The National Institute of Mental Health Psychopharmacology Service
Center Collaborative Study Group, Phenothiazine Treatment in Acute Schizophrenia: Effectiveness, 10 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 246 (1964); Goldberg, Klerman & Cole, Changes in
Schizophrenic Psychopathology and Ward Behaviour as a Function of Phenothiazine Treatment, Ill BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 120 (1965).
142. See the studies referenced in D. KLEIN & J. DAVIS, supra note 71, at chapter 4 and
in D. KLEIN, R. GITTELMAN, F. QUITKIN & A. RIFKIN, DIAGNOSIS AND DRUG TREATMENT OF
PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS: ADULTS AND CHILDREN 88-144 (2nd ed. 1980).
143. Davis, Overview: Maintenance Therapy in Psychiatry: I. Schizophrenia, 132 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1237 (1975).
144. Becker & Schulberg, Phasing Out State Hospitals-A Psychiatric Dilemma, 294
NEW ENG. J. MED. 255, 257 (1976).
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1980, the number had fallen to just over 137,000 patients. 1 45 Moreover, the average length of stay had been dramatically shortened,
with the primary locus of psychiatric care shifting from state hospitals to acute, short-stay, general hospitals, in which psychiatric patients are housed in discrete psychiatric units or commingled with
the regular medical and surgical population. 4 6
Despite the enormous impact of antipsychotic medications, it is
clear that they do not represent a panacea for schizophrenia and
other chronic psychotic illnesses. The medications suppress, but do
not "cure" the illnesses in chronic patients and often leave residual
symptoms, such as social withdrawal and idiosyncratic thought
processes, untouched. 47 Concern has also been expressed about the
short and long term side effects of the medications, which is considered in more detail below.
The acknowledged normalizing effects of the antipsychotic
medications, however, have not been the subject of much dispute in
the cases concerning these drugs. Courts involved in right-to-refusetreatment litigation and in criminal trials have not ordinarily questioned the efficacy of the medications in alleviating psychotic symptoms, although as noted above, some courts may have given these
properties little emphasis. 48 Instead, the controversies have often focused on the question of what additional effects these medications
may have: whether they affect thought processes in a fashion that
might be described as "mind control," or whether they interfere with
normal mentation so as to inhibit the ability of a defendant to function in his own defense. 49 These effects on psychological processes
have been the subject of a large number of investigations, but the
authors are unaware of any previous effort to synthesize the disparate strands of data into a coherent assessment of the medications'
effects.
B. Effects of Antipsychotic Medication on NonPsychopathologicalAspects of Mentation
1. Methodology.-Before discussing the substance of our com145.

See Goldman, Adams & Taube, Deinstitutionalization:The DataDemythologized,

34 Hosp. & COMMUNITY

PSYCHIATRY

129, 132 (1983).

146. Kiesler, Public and ProfessionalMyths About Mental Hospitalization:An Empirical Reassessment of Policy-Related Beliefs, 37 A,;. PSYCHOLOGIST 1323 (1982).
147. Baldessarini, Schizophrenia, 297 NEw ENG. J. MED. 988 (1977).
148. See supra notes 28-31, 59 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 8-63, 84-135 and accompanying text.
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pilation, some brief comments on our methodology are in order. The
following review considers all known studies on the effects of antipsychotic medication on the mentation (apart from overt psychotic
symptoms) of patients with psychotic illnesses. Studies of normal
populations or of patients with non-psychotic diagnoses have been
excluded from this review because the legitimate use of antipsychotic
medications is almost entirely limited to patients with psychotic.illnesses. 15 0 Thus, the legal issues raised by their use are also peculiar

to this particular group. In addition, the inclusion of non-psychotic
populations in such studies would provide an unfair basis for testing
these drugs, since absent the expected positive results, the only effects likely to be detected would be negative ones.
The studies reviewed below were generated by a search of the
Index Medicus for all papers, written between 1970 and 1982, concerning the effects of medication on memory, learning, and cognition. The references in each of these papers were then researched,
and a similar process was followed with the newly identified papers,
until no additional, relevant studies could be found. Although a
small number of studies may not have been detected by this search

process, it is unlikely that any significant number, or any major studies, escaped our investigation. After the papers were collected, we
excluded from our compilation those studies in which the populations
150. This is, however, a partial oversimplication. Antipsychotics may also be used to
treat the behavior disorders of patients with significant mental retardation. See, e.g., Heistad,
Zimmermann & Doebler, Long-Term Usefulness of Thioridazinefor Institutionalized Mentally RetardedPatients, 87 AM. J. MENTAL DEFICIENCY 243 (1982). It is unclear if the action
of these medications in retarded individuals resembles their action in non-retarded, psychotic
patients, or if another effect is involved. It should be noted that this use of antipsychotic medications is controversial and that it has been alleged to cause precisely the sort of impairments
in mentation that are the focus of this review. See Breuning, Ferguson, Davidson & Poling,
Effects of Thloridazine on the Intellectual Performanceof Mentally RetardedDrug Responders and Nonresponders, 40 ARCHIvES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 309 (1983). For reasons of manageability, however, this review will not include studies of the effect of antipsychotic medications
on mentally retarded patients who are (at least arguably) non-psychotic. The conclusions below should not be generalized to that population without a similarly thorough review of a
distinct body of literature.
Low doses of antipsychotics may also be used for the treatment of borderline personality
disorders. Brinkley, Beitman & Friedel, Low-Dose Neuroleptic Regimens in the Treatment of

Borderline Patients, 36

ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY

319 (1979). Since the data reviewed be-

low has been generated primarily from studies of schizophrenic and other grossly psychotic
patients, it is similarly unclear if it can be generalized to this diagnostic group.
Antipsychotic medications have other uses as well; for example, in the treatment of Gilles
de la Tourette's syndrome, although such use is relatively rare. See Shapiro, Shapiro &
Wayne, Treatment of Tourette's Syndrome with Haloperidol, Review of 34 Cases, 28
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY

92 (1973).
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were not clearly labeled as psychotic or in which there was no true
comparative design followed. The vast majority of studies which we
did utilize examined the effects of chlorpromazine on patients who
were diagnosed as schizophrenic. The papers in this review all analyzed one of the two following situations: (1) the performance of patients under at least two different conditions (i.e., drug versus no
drug); or (2) the performances of two or more comparable groups of
patients assigned to different conditions (i.e., antipsychotic versus
placebo or other medication).
Although these procedures assure a measure of facial validity to
the conclusions that follow, mention should be made of the inherent
difficulties involved in drawing generalized conclusions from a review
of these studies. Some studies considered the effects of medication on
acutely ill patients, who might be expected to be more responsive to
the beneficial effects of the medication, while others observed chronically ill patients, who might be more resistant to positive effects. If
deleterious effects were present, they would thus be expected to be
more prominent among chronic patients. There were also enormous
differences in dosage, method, and frequency of administration of
the medications. Dosages ranged from 25 to 1200 mg. of chlorpromazine, while usual clinical dosages vary between 200 to 800 mg. per
day. Patients in some studies received medication only once, while
others were treated for weeks or months before being tested. Beneficial effects of the medications are usually visible after a lag of a
week to ten days; adverse effects, such as sedation, may be evident
immediately, but may wear off with repeated administration. Singledose studies, therefore, can be expected to show quite different (and
probably more negative) results than studies using prolonged administration. Several investigators recognized that the effects of antipsychotic medications may endure for weeks or months after administration is halted and, therefore, provided "wash-out periods" of
varying lengths for their subjects. Others ignored this problem and
switched patients directly from drug to non-drug conditions.
The accuracy of diagnoses may also be an issue, especially in
earlier studies. Schizophrenics are known to display a variety of relevant abnormalities of mentation as a result of their illness.151 Given
151. See, e.g., Abrams, Redfield & Taylor, Cognitive Dysfunction in Schizophrenia,Affective Disorderand OrganicBrain Disease, 139 BIrT. J. PSYCHIATRY 190 (1981); Asarnow &
MacCrimmon, Span of Apprehension Deficits Duringthe PostpsychoticStages of Schizophrenia: A Replication and Extension, 38 ARCIHVES GEN. PSYCMATRY 1006 (1981); Braff & Saccuzzo, Information ProcessingDysfunction in ParanoidSchizophrenia: A Two-Factor Deficit,
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that schizophrenia was often overdiagnosed in previous years in the
United States,1 52 this may have led to non-homogeneous experimental populations. All of these problems may have compromised the
validity of individual studies and, therefore, complicate the task of
making comparisons across studies. Where these factors may have
played a role in altering study findings, their presence will be noted
below.
A final word of caution is needed about interpreting the findings
to be presented. The presence of an adverse or beneficial effect of the
medication as measured by the great variety of tests employed-even
when the findings are regarded as "statistically significant" (i.e., unlikely to be due solely to chance variation)--either may not be relevant to a patient's everyday functioning in a way that is significant
for the individual or may relate to functions that are only of value in
the psychological laboratory. Few studies have paused to consider
this important aspect of their findings.
The sections that follow represent a somewhat arbitrary grouping of the findings from these studies, since it is often difficult to
identify with precision the functions being assessed by a given test.
These sections do, however, have a practical use in providing at least
a rough classification of a diverse group of studies.
2. Effects of Antipsychotic Drugs on Memory.-Four studies
were found in which drug effects on memory were tested. Gardner et
al. did the earliest work in this area.153 Their 1955 study compared
nine chronic schizophrenics, who received moderate doses of chlorpromazine (up to 500 mg. per day) for an eight-week period, with
ten patients on placebo. They found no difference between the two
groups on the Graham-Kendall Memory-for-Designs Test.154 Later
work tended to confirm this lack of effect of antipsychotic drugs on
immediate memory, including a study by Daston of twenty-six
schizophrenics, who failed to show significant changes in immediate
memory, 155 and a study by Pearl using four memory scales with
138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1051 (1981).
152. See Pope & Lipinski, Diagnosis in Schizophrenia and Manic-Depressive Illness: A
Reassessment of the Specificity of 'Schizophrenic' Symptoms in the Light of Current Research, 35 ARCIHVEs GEN. PSYCHIATRY 811 (1978).
153. Gardner, Hawkins, Judah & Murphree, Objective Measurement of Psychiatric
Changes Produced by Chlorpromazine and Reserpine in Chronic Schizophrenia, 1 PSYCHIATRIC RESEARCH REPS. 77 (1955).
154. Id. at 77-78.
155. See Daston, Effects of Two PhenothiazineDrugs on Concentrative Attention Span
of Chronic Schizophrenics, 15 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 106, 108 (1959).
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forty-eight chronic schizophrenics that had a similar result. 15
The only exception to this trend was in a study by Belmont et
al.157 Comparing twelve probable acute schizophrenics on doses of
chlorpromazine up to 1200 mg. per day with seven patients on placebo, the researchers found a significant increase in the ability to
remember previous responses to a Rorschach test.158 On the other
hand, on a memory-for-digits test, the medicated patients had a significant drop in their ability to recall digits. In sum, most investigators have found the medications to have no effect on memory, and
the one conflicting study has internally inconsistent results.
3. Effects of Antipsychotic Drugs on Psychomotor Functioning.-A small number of experimental studies have indicated some
impairment in the psychomotor functioning of patients treated with
antipsychotic medication. Examining the acute administration of single 100 mg. and 200 mg. doses of chlorpromazine, Latz & Kornetsky found a significant decrease in the psychomotor output of eight
chronic schizophrenic patients."59 This finding may represent the
sedative effect of the medication, which usually disappears with repeated administration, a conclusion confirmed in another study by
Kornetsky, Pettit et al. 160 Thus, its relevance to the usual clinical
setting is questionable.
Two 1957 studies by Porteus (which may have involved overlapping samples) showed a decrease in the performance on the Porteus
maze test 16' by chronic schizophrenics medicated for at least six
156. Pearl, PhenothiazineEffects in Chronic Schizophrenia, 18 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL86 (1962). In a fifth scale test, however, an adverse effect on complex motor skills was
found, although intellectual functioning was not impaired. Id. at 87-88.
157. Belmont, Pollack, Willner, Klein & Fink, The Effects of Imipramine and Chlorpromazine on PerceptualAnalytic Ability, Perceptual Responsivity and Memory as Revealed
in Rorschach Responses, 137 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 42 (1963).
158. See id. at 47. The Rorschach test is the famous inkblot test in which subjects are
shown a number of abstract blots and asked to comment on the images they perceive. Elaborate scoring methods have been developed for quantitative and qualitative aspects of patients'
responses.
159. Latz & Kornetsky, The Effects of Chlorpromazine and Secobarbital under Two
Conditions of Reinforcement on the Performance of Chronic Schizophrenic Subjects, 7
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGIA 77 (1965).
160. Kornetsky, Pettit, Wynne, & Evarts, A Comparisonof the PsychologicalEffects of
Acute and Chronic Administration of Chlorpromazine and Secobarbital (Quinalbarbitone)in
Schizophrenic Patients, 105 J. MENTAL SCIENCE 190, 195 (1959).
161. A graded series of mazes are presented to subjects in this test designed by the
psychologist Porteus. Subjects are scored on various aspects of their accuracy in negotiating
the maze. The test is said to measure planning and foresight, as well as intelligence, although
psychomotor skills are also involved.
OGY
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weeks. l 2 Arguably, this test reflects the planning and foresight of
these schizophrenics as well as their psychomotor functions.163 The
validity of these results is uncertain, however, because they failed to
be replicated by two sets of later investigators. Daston found that
there were no significant differences on a stylus maze test 1 between
eight chronic schizophrenics, medicated for fifteen days with 1200
165
mg. of chlorpromazine daily, and eight patients on placebo.
Grygier & Waters had similar results with thirty chronic schizophrenic patients randomized to either 150 mg. of chlorpromazine or
to placebo over twelve weeks.166 A consistent effect of the medications on maze performance thus remains unproven.
Of the remaining studies, almost all found antipsychotic medication to have no effect on psychomotor functioning: Heilizer observed no effect of chlorpromazine on finger dexterity, although consistency of responses increased;16 7 Tourlentes et al. could not detect
an effect on motor speed; 168 Whitehead & Thune reported no change
in the ability to acquire motor skills;169 and Rosen et al. saw no
change in body activity or scanning behavior. 170 All of these studies
were on schizophrenics who were mostly chronic and treated with
antipsychotic drugs for at least several weeks. An additional study
by Pearl found impairment on only one of five psychomotor tests, the
Purdue Pegboard test." 1 Clark et al., however, found an improve162. Porteus, Maze Test Reactions After Chlorpromazine,21 J. CONSULTING PSYCHOLOGY 15 (1957); Porteus & Barclay, A FurtherNote on Chlorpromazine:Maze Reactions, 21

J. CONSULTING PSYCHOLOGY 297 (1957).
163. See Porteus & Barclay, supra note 162, at 298-99.
164. In this test, subjects are asked to trace their way through a maze using a stylus
that is wired to record contact with the sides of the maze. Simultaneously, the stylus records
the path taken through the maze on a sheet of paper placed under the apparatus. The goal is
to make one's way through the maze as quickly as possible, without touching the sides and
avoiding blind alleys.
165. Daston, Stylus Maze Performanceof Chronic Schizophrenics Taking Chlorpromazine, 22 J. CONSULTING PSYCHOLOGY 384 (1958).

166.

Grygier & Waters, Chlorpromazine Used with an Intensive Occupational Therapy

Program, 79 A.M.A. ARCHIVES NEUROLOGY & PSYCHIATRY 697 (1958).

167. Heilizer, The Effects of Chlorpromazine Upon Psychomotor and PsychiatricBehavior of Chronic Schizophrenic Patients, 128 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 358 (1959).
168. Tourlentes, Hunsicker & Hurd, Chlorpromazine and Communication Processes,
79 A.M.A. ARCHIVES NEUROLOGY & PSYCHIATRY 468 (1958).

169.

Whitehead & Thune, The Effects of Chlorpromazine on Learning in Chronic

Psychotics, 22 J. CONSULTING PSYCHOLOGY 379 (1958).
170. See Rosen, Tureff, Daruna, Johnson, Lyons & Davis, Pharmacotherapyof Schizo-

phrenia and Affective Disorders:Behavioral Correlatesof Diagnostic and Demographic Variables, 89 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 378 (1980).

171.

See Pearl, supra note 156, at 87-88. The Purdue Pegboard test requires subjects to
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ment on the Purdue Pegboard using a similar population of chronic
patients as well as similar doses of medication. 17 2
Thus, most experimental studies in this area tend to show that
antipsychotic medications have no effect on psychomotor function
and those studies which do evidence some impairment have been uniformly contradicted by later efforts. It would be naive, however, to
accept at face value this apparent lack of significant effect demonstrated in these studies. Whatever their usual effect on the capacities
measured by these researchers, clinical experience-supported by a
large body of literature-attests to the often dramatic effects of
these medications on patients' motor functions.17 3 Within a decade of
the introduction of chlorpromazine in this country, it was widely recognized that phenothiazines can have a substantial effect on the extrapyramidal motor system.17 4
The most common acute motor side effects of the medications
are parkinsonism, dystonia, dyskinesia, and akathisia. 17 51 Drug induced parkinsonism resembles naturally occurring Parkinson's disease. Among the symptoms that may be induced are a resting tremor
of the extremities, muscular rigidity, and hypokinesia (a decrease in
spontaneous movement).17 6 Although parkinsonism usually has no
effect on mentation, cases have been reported of severe hypokinesia
(called akinesia) in which the decrease in spontaneous movement,
speech, and display of emotion have induced reactive states of depression.17 7 These reports stress the necessity for differentiating these
states from true depression or schizophrenic apathy and withdrawal.
One reliable technique for making such a differentiation is available;
severe akinesia with effects on mentation is nearly always accompamanipulate small objects on a pegboard. Tasks include inserting pins into the board as rapidly
as possible, and sequentially assembling several small objects into a patterned unit.
172. Clark, Ray & Ragland, Chlorpromazine in Chronic Schizophrenic Women: Rate
of Onset and Rate of Dissipation of Drug Effects, 25 PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 212 (1963).
173. See Ayd, A Survey of Drug-InducedExtrapyramidalReactions, 175 J. AL.MED.
Assoc. 1054, 1054-60 (1961); Chien, Greenblatt, Di Mascio & Shader, Drug-induced Ex-

trapyramidal and Neurological Symptoms, inCLINICAL

HANDBOOK

OF PSYCHOPHARMA-

COLOGY 229-46 (A. Di Mascio, R. Shader, eds. 1970).
174. See Ayd, supra note 173, at 1054-60.
175. Id. at 1054-55. Akathisia will be considered last because it differs from the others
in that it primarily affects mentation rather than movement.

176. Id. at 1055-59.
177. Rifkin, Quitkin & Klein, Akinesia: A Poorly Recognized Drug-Induced Extrapyramidal Behavioral Disorder, 32 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 672 (1975); Van Putten
& May, "Akinetic Depression" in Schizophrenia, 35 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1101
(1978).
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nied by overt sedation. 178 All parkinsonian symptoms are usually responsive either to a reduction in dose of medication or to the addition of "anti-parkinsonian" medication, which counteracts the effects
of the antipsychotics on the motor system without interfering with
their beneficial effects on cognition.
Dystonias are acute and often painful spasms of muscle groups
in the neck, back, face, eyes, or elsewhere in the body. They usually
occur early in the course of treatment and especially in young
males.170 Intravenous anti-parkinsonian medications can immediately
alleviate dystonias, while maintenance doses of oral anti-parkinsonian drugs can prevent their recurrence.
Dyskinesias are involuntary, repetitive motor movements, such
as flicking the tongue in and out of the mouth or complex movements of the fingers. They are ordinarily not painful and the patient
may not even be aware of them. Dyskinesias also responds to antiparkinsonian medications.
Akathisia differs from the other types of drug induced extrapyramidal symptoms because it is primarily an emotional state,
characterized by a subjective need or desire to move.180 The most
common symptom of akathisia is tapping of the feet or shifting of
the legs-movements of which the patient may not be aware.1 81 Occasionally, however, akathisia can emerge as anxiety or tension that
resembles psychogenically induced states. 82 Akathisia can be confused with an exacerbation of psychosis or can, on occasion, lead to
such an exacerbation."" The most reliable means of diagnosis is to
ask the patient whether he or she is experiencing a sense of inner
restlessness. 84 As with all of the other acute motor side effects of
antipsychotic medications, akathisia can be controlled by reducing
dosage or adding anti-parkinsonian medications. 85
A long term side effect that is often referred to in court decisions on the right to refuse treatment is tardive dyskinesia.' 86 Like
178.

Van Putten, May & Wilkins, Importance of Akinesia: Plasma Chlorpromazine

and Prolactin Levels, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1446 (1980).

179. See Ayd, supra note 173, at 1054-55.
180.

43 (1975).
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Van Putten, The Many Faces of Akathisia, 16 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 43,

See id. at 45.
See Id. at 44.
Id. at 44-45.
See id. at 45.
Id. at 46.
See supra notes 14-17, 39-43 and accompanying text.
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acute dyskinesias, tardive dyskinesias are involuntary movements of
facial, arm, leg, or occasionally truncal musculature, but usually appear only after prolonged use of antipsychotic medications (months
to years).18 7 Although the incidence of tardive dyskinesia is unclear,
it has been estimated that 10 to 40% of patients receiving long term
treatment may be affected. 188 Usually overlooked by most courts are
the facts that tardive dyskinesia is generally mild, not necessarily
progressive and very often disappears if antipsychotic medication can
be halted."8 Although severe cases may induce some subjective distress, it is not uncommon, as with acute dyskinesias, for patients to
be completely unaware of their movements. Moreover, primary effects on mentation have not been reported. Thus, tardive dyskinesia
is of limited relevance to the issue of the effects of antipsychotic
drugs on mentation in general.
In summary, the foregoing review of studies examining the psychomotor effects of antipsychotic medication illustrates paradoxical
results. While experimental studies fail to provide clear-cut evidence
of more subtle negative effects, clinical studies document frequent,
grosser abnormalities. Particularly important, however, are the findings that these acute side effects typically affect only the motor system and not mental functioning, are usually easily identifiable, and
almost invariably respond to a lowering of antipsychotic dosage or
the prescription of anti-parkinsonian medication. 90 Although there
are cases in which effects on mentation do occur (in akinesia and
akathisia), if the etiologic role of the medication is not considered,
the true cause of the symptoms may be overlooked. The frequency of
these cases is unclear from the literature, but the authors' clinical
experience suggests that failure to recognize medication as the cause
of important psychomotor side effects that may affect mentation is
probably uncommon.' 9 '
187. American Psychiatric Association, Task Force Report #18, Tardive Dyskinesia at
57 (1979).
188. Id. at 44.
189. Id. at 24-28. Although no effective treatment has yet been found for persistent

cases of tardive dyskinesia, its treatment is the subject of active research.
190. There are, of course, cases in which clinical efficacy cannot be achieved below a

dosage of antipsychotic medication that produces significant extrapyramidal effects. A decision

must then be made (preferably by the patient, if competent to do so) whether the potential

benefits of continuing the medication outweigh the harms incurred by the side effects.
191.

It may be argued justifiably that the authors' experience is primarily drawn from

university-affiliated, teaching hospitals, and that failure to recognize the etiology of such side
effects may be greater in understaffed state hospitals. Although the argument is valid, the

point remains that it is the authors' impression that a careful examination of the patient and
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4. Effects of Antipsychotic Drugs on Attention and Perception.-Since the distinction between the effects the drugs have on
one's perception and their effects on one's attention is difficult to ascertain, they will be discussed in the same section. The most striking
finding from a review of the relevant studies in this area is the diversity of results, with roughly equal numbers of studies showing impairment in function, improvement in function, or no change.
Two of the studies demonstrating some impairment in attention
derive from Kornetsky's work with administration of single doses of
chlorpromazine. Eight male, chronic schizophrenic patients showed
significant decreases in sustained attention and increased response
latency when given 100 or 200 mg. of chlorpromazine, compared
with a placebo. 192 An earlier study by this group had indicated im193
pairment on two measures of sustained attention (pursuit rotor
and tachistoscopic threshold tests19 4 ) in chronic schizophrenics after
chlorpromazine treatment, but the impairment was less than that
sustained by a group of normal control subjects who received the
95
medication.
Three'studies of longer term administration of antipsychotics
reached similar conclusions. Pearl found that thirty-two chronic
schizophrenics, who received one of four phenothiazines for twelve
weeks, had a significantly poorer performance on the Perceptual
Span Test' 96 than sixteen similar patients on placebo. 9 7 On the
other hand, accuracy of perception of objects in the peripheral visual
fields was unaffected. Allport et al. examined eight schizophrenic patients receiving an unspecified dose of chlorpromazine compared to
eight on placebo for two weeks. 98 No "wash-out" period was proconsideration of the possible causes of his symptoms will usually implicate the medication, if
that is the cause of the syndrome. Nonmedical personnel, for example defense lawyers, could

be taught to recognize likely signs of drug effects as well. Thus, although the effects are real,
they are not ordinarily insidious or undetectable as suggested by the court decisions cited

earlier.
192.

Latz & Kornetsky, supra note 159, at 84-85.

193.

Pursuit rotor test measures perceptual-motor abilities by asking subjects to attempt

to maintain contact with a target that is on a moving turntable.
194. The tachistoscopic threshold test involves a tachistoscope which projects images on
a screen for brief periods. The threshold test measures the minimum duration of projection at

which stimuli can be identified.
195.

Kornetsky, Pettit, Wynne & Evarts, supra note 160, at 195. Prolonged administra-

tion over two weeks, however, resulted in no impairment at all. Id.
196. As varying numbers of small circles are projected briefly on a screen in this test,
subjects' accuracy of perception is measured.
197. See Pearl, supra note 156, at 88-89.
198. Allport, Crookes & Watt, The Effects of Reserpine and Chlorpromazineon Stimu-
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vided to minimize the continuing effects of previous medication. The
chlorpromazine group showed statistically non-significant increases
in distractibility on two tests, an increase with no measure of significance on a third test, and no significant change on a fourth. The
patients receiving chlorpromazine also had more difficulty maintaining an attentional set than the control patients.199
Finally, Lloyd and Newbrough studied eighteen schizophrenic
men-it is unclear if they were acutely or chronically ill-before and
after twelve weeks of substantial doses of phenothiazines. 200 This
study is complicated by the fact that two of the medications used
(i.e., Compazine and Pacatal) are now recognized to have no substantial antipsychotic effects. The group as a whole displayed significant decreases in several tests of perception and attention: critical
flicker fusion frequency, 2°1 auditory discrimination sensitivity, and
kinesthetic aftereffects judgment 0 2 There was a non-significant
trend to slowed reaction time and much greater variability on all
tests after the medication. 03
In contrast to these findings, other investigators have noted improvements in attention and perception when the medications are administered. Saucer compared eighteen chronic schizophrenics who
were receiving unspecified doses of chlorpromazine for at least one
week with twenty patients who had not been treated for at least one
month. 0 4 The treated patients displayed a normalization of a defect
in perception of apparent motion that appears to be consistently
found in schizophrenics.20 5 Daston found an improvement in associative learning (a measure of concentrative attention span) in twentyfour chronic schizophrenic patients receiving chlorpromazine versus
three other medications, as well as a placebo, in a cross-over delus-Satiation and Distractibility in Human

Subjects,

4

INT.

CONGRESS

NEURO-

93 (1963).
199. See id. at 96-99.
200. Lloyd & Newbrough, Sensory Changes with PhenothiazineMedication In Schizo-

PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY

phrenic Patients, 139 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 169 (1964).

201. Critical flicker fusion frequency is measured by asking subjects to look into a black
box at a four mm. square patch of light. The light is made to flicker at defined frequencies.
The fusion frequency is the rate of flickering at which the subject perceived the light not to be
flickering at all. It is a test of visual perception.
202. This test of tactile perception involves blindfolded subjects comparing the size of
two wooden blocks before and after the subjects' hands are stimulated by rubbing. Loss of
accuracy with stimulation and speed of recovery are measured.
203. Lloyd & Newbrough, supra note 200, at 172-74.
204. Saucer, Chlorpromazine and Apparent Motion Perceptionby Schizophrenics, 23 J.
CONSULTING PSYCHOLOGY 134 (1959).
205. Id.at 136.
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sign.2 06 Orzack et al. used the Continuous Performance Test 207 to
measure the attention of eighteen chronic schizophrenics treated
with carphenazine (a phenothiazine not currently in use) for twelve
weeks.20 8 Patients showed significant improvement with the
medications.2 0
Other studies demonstrating improvement with medication included Magaro and Vojtisek's study of the performance of a mixed
sample of schizophrenics on the Embedded Figures Test.2 10 The only
significant effect was an improvement in the scores of the "poor
prognosis" paranoid schizophrenic subsample. Phillipson et al., in a
recent sophisticated study of nine acute schizophrenics examining
the correlation between plasma levels of chlorpromazine and clinical
improvement, found that non-hallucinatory perceptual disorders
were the most sensitive of all symptoms to increasing plasma levels
of the drug.2"' Another recent, multifaceted study by Spohn et al.
compared twenty chronic schizophrenics receiving chlorpromazine
for eight weeks, in clinically appropriate dosages, with twenty similar patients receiving a placebo.21 2 This was one of the most sophisticated of the studies reviewed, utilizing an adequate "wash-out" period, random assignment, and double-blind procedures. Their
findings indicated a decrease for the drug group in one measure of
reaction time (ability to sustain a set to unpredictable stimuli), an
improvement in vigilance, and a variety of improvements in perception, including: a reduction in overestimation and fixation time, in206. Daston, supra note 155, at 107, 109.
207. The Continuous Performance Test is a method of studying sustained attention. The
subject is required to fix his eyes on a visual display for long intervals and depress a key when
particular stimuli appear. These stimuli appear for brief durations (0.1 and 0.2 seconds) at
about the rate of one per second.
208. Orzack, Kornetsky & Freeman, The Effects of Daily Administration of
Carphenazine on Attention in the Schizophrenic Patient, 11 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGIA (BERL.)
31 (1967).
209. Id. at 37.
210. Magaro & Vojtisek, Embedded FiguresPerformanceof Schizophrenics as a Function of Chronicity, PremorbidAdjustment, Diagnosis, and Medication,77 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 184 (1971). Subjects in the Embedded Figures Test are required to locate simple
figures in complex designs organized so as to conceal the figure. The ability to perceive the
figures ("field independence") is believed to correlate, among other things, with creative problem solving ability, but is also influenced by the ability to concentrate.
211. Phillipson, McKeown, Baker & Healey, CorrelationBetween Plasma Chlorpromazine and its Metabolites and Clinical Ratings in Patients with Acute Relapse of Schizophrenic and ParanoidPsychosis, 131 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 172 (1977).
212. Spohn, Lacoursiere, Thompson & Coyne, Phenothiazine Effects on Psychological
and Psychophysiological Dysfunction in Chronic Schizophrenics, 34 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 633 (1977).
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creased accuracy of perceptual judgments, and an increase in rapid
recognition of visual stimuli." 3 Abrams, in a separate study, also
found a significant decrease in perceptual distortion in a chlorpromazine treated group of chronic schizophrenics compared with
controls receiving a placebo. 14
Furthermore, a third set of studies indicated no effect on attention and perception as a result of antipsychotic medication. These
included single dose studies that failed to show effects on reaction
time' 15 or attention to competing voice messages. 1 6 Also included
were sustained dosage studies examining auditory acuity (arguably a
measure of ability to attend),217 changes in recognition threshold of
simple visual stimuli,21 8 and reaction time.219 It is interesting to note
that this last study did find increased consistency in the medicated
group.
Efforts to resolve inconsistencies between these three sets of
studies are hampered by differences in methodologies, particularly
the use of varying doses of medication and different measures of attention and perception. The most careful and extensive study, by
Spohn et al., showed generally positive effects of medication, 220 but
there is too much conflicting data from other studies to accept that
conclusion before a replication has been undertaken.
In summary, all that can be safely concluded is that effects on
attention and perception have been neither proven nor disproven, although the better studies tend to show improvement. The conflicting
results also suggest that if any effects exist, their magnitude is likely
to be small.
5. Effects of Antipsychotic Drugs on Other Complex Functions.-A number of measurable psychological functions require the
213.

Id. at 634-35, 637-41.

214. See Abrams, Chlorpromazine in Treatment of Chronic Schizophrenia, 19 DISEASES
NERVOUS SYSTEM 20, 27-28 (1958).
215. Wynne & Kornetsky, The Effects of Chlorpromazineand Secobarbitalon the Re-

action Times of Chronic Schizophrenics, 1 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGIA 294 (1960).
216. Rappaport, Rogers, Reynolds & Weinmann, ComparativeAbility of Normal and
ChronicSchizophrenic Subjects to Attend to Competing Voice Messages: Effects of Method
of Presentation, Message Load and Drugs, 143 J. NERvoUs & MENTAL DISEASE 16, 26
(1966). This may be due in part, however, to the low dosage given in testing.

217. See Ludwig, Wood & Downs, Auditory Studies in Schizophrenia, 119 Ahi. J. Psy122, 125-26 (1962).

CHIATRY

218. Efron, Changes in Recognition Thresholds Associated with Chlorpromazine,
Promazine and Phenobarbital,15 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 431, 433 (1959).
219. Heilizer, supra note 167, at 364.
220. See Spohn, Lacoursiere, Thompson & Coyne, supra note 212, at 633, 641, 643.
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integrated operation of the mind. These functions, designated herein
as "complex," are considered in this section. With few exceptions,
the studies reviewed below reveal either drug related improvement in
performance or the lack of an effect. Diminution in complex functioning as a result of medication is rarely shown.
Studies with positive results are discussed first. Like many studies, a report by Gardner et al. examined several subtests of the
Wechsler-Bellevue Intelligence Scale (WBIS). 221 The researchers
found that nine chronic schizophrenics receiving 500 mg. of chlorpromazine for eight weeks did better than ten untreated control subjects on picture completion and similarities, but not on vocabulary
subtests. 222 Tests of significance were not used. Gilgash, using a similar design with twenty-two patients in each group, found a statistically significant comparative increase in full scale intelligence on the
WBIS for his medicated group; highest gains tended to be on performance subtests.22 a Abrams also found a significant increase in IQ,
but both medication and control groups improved equally. 24 The
medication group, however, did significantly better on the similarities subtest, a test of logical thinking. The other study that confirmed
a significant increase in IQ on the WBIS was performed by Castner
et al. who found the greatest improvement on the performance
subscales 25
Another common measurement device was the Rorschach projective test.226 Nickols found a significant increase in spontaneity in
a group of chronic schizophrenics receiving chlorpromazine, but not
in a control group. 2 Belmont et al., comparing twelve patients on
chlorpromazine with seven controls, indicated an increase in perceptual responsiveness for their medicated group, as measured by the
221. The WBIS is an early version of a standard IQ test that compares subjects' responses on a large number of questions to standardized norms. The test has a number of
subsections that measure both verbal and performance skills. It is a forerunner of the Wechsler
Adult Intelligence Scale, now in common use.
222. See Gardner, Hawkins, Judah & Murphee, supra note 153, at 78-81.
223. Gilgash, Effects of Thorazine on Wechsler Scores of Adult CatatonicSchizophrenIcs, 3 PSYCHOLOGICAL REPS. 561, 561-62 (1957).
224. See Abrams, supra note 214, at 28.
225. Castner, Covington & Nickols, The Effects of a Thorazine-Centered Treatment
Program with PsychologicalEvaluations, 16 TEXAS REPORTS BIOLOGY & MED. 21 (1958).

226. See supra note 158.
227. Nickols, A Controlled Exploratory Investigation into the Effects of Thorazine
upon Mental Test Scores of Chronic Hospitalized Schizophrenics, 8 PSYCHOLOGICAL REC.
67, 72-73, 75 (1958).
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variety of responses on the Rorschach.228 Perceptual analytic ability,
derived from the percentage of well-analyzed responses, did not
change. Saretsky noted an improvement in "mean defense effectiveness," the ability to deal with bizarre material, in schizophrenic patients receiving chlorpromazine for three months. 22 9 The production
of bizarre material, however, was unaltered.
A wide variety of other positive findings with antipsychotics
have been reported by the following: Porteus, in mental confusion
and speech order with chlorpromazine treatment; 230 Abrams 231 and
Meadow et al., in conceptual disorganization; 23 2 Clark et al., in errors on the digit symbol subtest of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence
Scale;2 33 Phillipson et al., in overinclusive thinking;2 4 and Braff and
Saccuzzo, in delays of information processing. 3 5 A collaborative
study sponsored by the National Institute of Mental Health indicated improvements in confusion, disorientation, and incoherent
speech. 3 6 Whitehead and Thune found significantly better performance on verbalized social adaptations with chlorpromazine and an
improvement in the number of patients who could tolerate testing.237
There were no differences in problem solving or serial verbal
learning.2 8
Phenothiazines have been shown to reduce errors of excessive
breadth of concepts in twenty-four chronic schizophrenics, but also
to increase random errors, while not affecting errors of excessively
narrow interpretations. 3 9 Medication has also been found to increase
228.
229.

71 J.

Belmont, Pollack, Willner, Klein & Fink, supra note 157, at 44-48.
Saretsky, Effects of Chlorpromazine on Primary-ProcessThought Manifestations,

ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY

247 (1966).

230. See Porteus, Specific Behavior Changes Following Chlorpromazine, 21 J. CONSULTING PSYCHOLOGY 257, 260 (1957).
231. See Abrams, supra note 214, at 27-28.
232. See Meadow, Donlon & Blacker, Effects of Phenothiazineson Anxiety and Cogni-

tion in Schizophrenia, 36 DISEASES NERVOUS SYSTEM 203 (1975).
233. Clark, Ray & Ragland, supra note 172.
234. Phillipson, Baker & Williams, Change in "Overinclusive" Thinking of Schizophrenic Patients is Related to Plasma Phenothiazine Concentration,24 ADVANCES BIOCHEMICAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 591 (1980).
235. Braff & Saccuzzo, Effect of Antipsychotic Medication on Speed of Information
Processing in Schizophrenic Patients, 139 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1127 (1982).

236. The National Institute of Mental Health Psychopharmacology Service Center Collaborative Study Group, supra note 141, at 252-55, 259-60.
237. Whitehead & Thune, supra note 169, at 381, 383.

238. Id. at 381.
239. Chapman & Knowles, The Effects of Phenothiazine on Disordered Thought in
Schizophrenia, 28 J. CONSULTING PSYCHOLOGY 165 (1964).
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laughing, smiling, and social interactions. 4 In a study by Hymowitz
and Spohn, twenty-two chronic scizophrenic patients were tested
three weeks after antipsychotic medication was stopped, and were
compared to an equal group that continued to receive the medications.2 41 The study indicated that the "[m]edicated patients were
more verbally communicative and showed an increase in the complexity and coherence of their speech and a decrease in pathological
utterances. 242
Findings that antipsychotic medications have no effect on complex functions are more uncommon than those findings of positive
effects discussed above. Nickols saw no effect of chlorpromazine on
the WBIS or the Arthur Point Stencil Designs Test;243 Castner et al.
found no consistent changes on the Rorschach test;24 4 Pearl indicated
no changes on several Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale subtests; 24 5
Grygier and Waters found no change in tests of vocabulary or information; 246 Tourlentes et al. could detect no alterations in several
measures of communication ability (verbal and non-verbal intellectual functioning, fluency, speed of recognition, and suggestibility); 247
and Spohn et al. saw no effect on measures of abstraction and autistic and overinclusive thinking, although there was a trend towards
improvement in cognitive functioning on clinical measures.2 48
A few studies have demonstrated negative effects of antipsychotic medications on complex cognitive functions. Latz and Kornetsky, again using single doses, reported a decrease in cognitive-associative functioning in eight schizophrenics.2 49 Examining the
complexity of sentence structure, Goldman-Eisler et al. found that
25 mg. of intravenous chlorpromazine, given as a single dose, produced a fall-off in complexity in two schizophrenic patients. 250 This
240. Rosen, Tureff, Daruna, Johnson, Lyons & Davis, supra note 170, at 382.
241. Hymowitz & Spohn, The Effects of Antipsychotic Medication on the Linguistic
Abilityof Schizophrenics, 168 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 287 (1980).

242. Id. at 287.
243.

Nickols, supra note 227, at 75. The Arthur Point Stencil Designs Test requires

subjects to superimpose two or more of 18 cards in order to match a pattern presented by the
tester.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

See Castner, Covington & Nickols, supra note 225, at 26.
See Pearl, supra note 156, at 87.
Grygier & Waters, supra note 166, at 702.
Tourlentes, Hunsicker & Hurd, supra note 168, at 470-71.
Spohn, Lacoursiere, Thompson & Coyne, supra note 212, at 640-41.
Lantz & Kornetsky, supra note 159, at 84.
Goldman-Eisler, Skarbek & Henderson, A PsycholinguisticEnquiry into the Effect
of Chlorpromazine on Complex Cognitive Processes, 4 INT. CONGRESS NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY

365 (1963).
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finding, however, may be related to the sedation produced by this
highly unusual mode of administration. Finally, Rosen et al. examined the frequency of social interactions in newly admitted,
psychotic patients. 51 Comparing seventeen patients who were medicated with antipsychotics shortly after admission with twenty-four
subjects who were kept medication-free for two to three weeks, they
found that the medication tended to produce a transient decrease in
social interaction frequency, which returned to normal after three to
four weeks. 252

Studies of complex functions in psychotic patients indicate overwhelmingly that antipsychotic medications improve functioning on a
variety of measures. This observation might be expected from the
previously described efficacy of these medications in alleviating
clinical symptomatology, since the effects of psychosis are likely to
be greatest on capacities that require an integration of higher
functions.
IV. A

SUGGESTED APPROACH TO THE LEGALLY RELEVANT
EFFECTS OF ANTIPSYCHOTIC MEDICATIONS

Since the foregoing review of the relevant studies and reports
has been completed, it is now appropriate to synthesize the presented
data into a comprehensive and empirically valid view of the effects of
antipsychotic drugs. It should first be noted, however, that the need
for such an overview transcends the questions of a right to refuse
treatment or the effects of antipsychotic medications on defendants'

performance at trial. Medication effects on mentation may raise
important issues in a wide variety of legal contexts, for example:
25 3
challenges to a person's contractual or testamentary capacity;

assessments of the acceptability of defendants' waiver of their constitutional rights;2 " or determinations of the need for the appointment

of a guardian.255 In fact, whenever the courts are confronted with
251. Rosen, Tureff, Daruna, Johnson, Lyons & Davis, supra note 170, at 379.
252. Id. at 381-84.
253. Cf. Powell v. Weld, 410 Ill. 198, 101 N.E.2d 581 (1951) (testamentary capacity
necessary to execute a valid will is defined as sound mind and memory, as reflected by factors
such as: sufficient mental capacity to understand the nature of one's property, the ability to
transact ordinary business, and the ability to know one's relatives).

254. In order for such a waiver to be legally valid, it must be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily by the defendant. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). Such
rights include, for example, the right to refuse consent to search, right to Miranda warnings,
and right to effective counsel.
255. Cf Long v. Campion, 250 Minn. 196, 84 N.W.2d 686 (1957) (one who, because of

physical or mental incompetence, is adjudged incapable of managing his own property may
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the need to determine the actual or potential functioning of an individual who is receiving antipsychotic medication, some assumptions
concerning the nature of medication effects will inevitably enter into
the decision.
It seems fair to conclude that courts should have no hesitancy in
acknowledging the demonstrated efficacy of antipsychotic medications in alleviating the symptoms of psychosis and in preventing their
recurrence. These normalizing effects have been indicated in a multitude of studies.256 Psychotic symptoms, such as disordered thinking,
agitation, and hallucinations, have been found to be suppressed or
eliminated, thereby facilitating the re-emergence of normal patterns
of cognition. Even when the medications fail to resolve completely
the symptoms of psychotic illness, their effect is to alter mental functioning in the direction of normality. Although a patient's remission
induced by medication may be dependent on the continued administration of drugs, the resulting cognition and behavior should not be
considered "synthetic" in the sense that it is detectably different
from the patient's functioning in the natural absence of a psychotic
illness.
Assuming that the primary effect of antipsychotic medications
on psychotic symptoms is indeed a normalizing one, the question remains whether secondary effects of the drugs might impair other aspects of mental functioning. Based on existing data, with one exception to be addressed below, such a mental impairment seems highly
unlikely. The few studies of the effects of antipsychotic drugs on
memory generally indicated that there was no adverse impact. Although further, more detailed investigations might be of interest,
there is at present no reason to believe that they would yield different results. Experimental studies of effects on psychomotor functioning similarly failed, in general, to demonstrate deleterious effects of
the medication. Although the studies reviewed that focused on diverse aspects of attention and perception had more mixed results, the
better and more recent studies indicated a beneficial effect of the
medications in this area. Nonetheless, this is a subject about which
further inquiry, particularly if performed at the level of sophistication of Spohn et al.,257 might be most useful. Finally, empirical studies of antipsychotic drug effects on complex cognitive functions-those capabilities most likely to be of relevance to the legal
have a guardian appointed for him by the courts).
256. See supra note 142.
257.

See generally Spohn, Lacoursiere, Thompson & Coyne, supra note 212.
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issues outlined above-overwhelmingly show a positive effect of the
medications.
Yet, as previously discussed, these studies do have their limitations. They certainly cannot be generalized to non-psychotic or normal populations, though it is difficult to imagine any legitimate circumstances in which a normal individual would be treated with
antipsychotic drugs. 258 Available evidence suggests, however, that
psychotic medications lack the subtle, deleterious effects on mental
functioning attributed to them by several of the opinions on mental
patients' right to refuse treatment. 25 9 The experimental data cannot
be interpreted as being consistent with a view of these drugs as
mind-altering, thought-inhibiting, or destructive of personality in a
negative sense. In fact, the beneficial effects of the medication on
complex aspects of mentation suggest that the opposite conclusion is
true: the medications reinforce the most important aspects of mental
functioning.
As noted previously, an important caveat must be mentioned
here. It is clear from the clinical literature that two of the side effects of antipsychotic medication on the motor system have the potential of affecting mentation adversely. Akinesia is sometimes accompanied by states of reactive depression and akathisia may be
characterized by subjective emotional distress.260 Yet fears of "mind
control," even in these two situations, are still unwarranted. Many
medications, when not monitored carefully, have the potential to induce side effects that affect mental functioning. 261 The proper response when any such effects appear is to consider the medication as
a possible causative agent and to take appropriate measures to alleviate the symptoms. In most cases, this will mean a modification of the
dosage or a discontinuation of the medication.
The situation differs for antipsychotic medications only in that
many psychiatrists and other physicians were, for a long time, unaware of the potential for these medications to induce such effects.
Most of the time, however, there is nothing subtle about the presen258. The situation may be different for mentally disordered people with non-psychotic
conditions. See supra note 150. These findings should not be assumed to be valid for those
groups without further investigation.
259. See supra notes 9-63 and accompanying text.
260. See text accompanying notes 177-83.
261. Drugs which may induce such side effects include: digitalis, the most commonly
used drug to alleviate congestive heart failure; anti-hypertensive medications; and many of the
new, non-steroidal, anti-inflammatory medications used for relief of arthritis and other painful
conditions.
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tation of the patient's symptoms and a well-trained psychiatrist
should suspect the etiologic role of medication. An injection of intravenous anti-parkinsonian medication will usually provide an immediate answer to the question of whether medication induced akinesia or
akathisia is present. If either condition is diagnosed, the proper steps
can be taken. Further, it should be noted that these effects on mentation occur so rarely-although the accompanying motor effects may
be more common-that they did not prevent most studies from
showing a positive or neutral effect of the drugs.
V.

CONCLUSION

A comparison between the rulings in recent criminal cases and
the right-to-refuse-treatment cases analyzing the effects of antipsychotic drugs indicates that the former generally display a more accurate understanding of antipsychotic medications. The decisions in the
criminal cases emphasized the restorative effects of the medication
and typically failed to find any adverse effects on mental functioning.
The right-to-refuse-treatment cases, on the other hand, downplayed
the medication's positive effects, highlighted side effects, and created
largely unwarranted concerns about possible negative impacts on
mentation. Although a more realistic view of the effects of antipsychotic medications would not necessarily preclude courts from finding a constitutional right to refuse treatment, the rationale of many
of the opinions-grounded as they are in the rights to freedom of
thought, liberty, and privacy-might well seem less convincing if the
spectre of "mind control" were dispelled. Regardless of whether the
holdings would be altered, it is difficult to disagree that the opinions
should be based on an accurate view of the effects of the drugs.
It is hoped that courts, which in the future will have to grapple
with the question of the effects of antipsychotic drugs on mentation,
will pay heed to the substantial body of experimental data in this
area reviewed herein as the starting-point for their deliberations. In
so doing, the legal analysis which flows from these courts' medical
observations can only be more firmly grounded upon both factual
and legal truths.
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